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INTRODUCTION
The United States electrical grid is a marvelous feat of engineering,
with the National Academy of Engineering naming “Electrification”
the “Greatest Engineering Achievement of the 20th Century.”1 The
extent of the United States electrical grid infrastructure is vast,
representing over $1 trillion in assets and 360,000 miles of
transmission lines connecting over 6000 power plants.2 Electricity has
been integrated into the daily lives of U.S. citizens in innumerable
ways.

1. GREATEST ENGINEERING ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE 20TH CENTURY,
http://www.greatachievements.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
2. INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. & ENERGY RESTORATION, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
LARGE POWER TRANSFORMERS AND THE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 5 (2012), available at
http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/large-power-transformers-and-us-electric-gridreport-june-2012.
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While the electrical grid is undoubtedly an impressive human
innovation worthy of great respect, it is also outdated.3 Some
equipment that makes up the physical infrastructure has already
passed its expected life span.4 Failing grid equipment was the cause
of nearly twenty percent of sustained power outages from 2008 to
2011.5 In light of the Obama Administration’s commitment to
developing sources and distribution of renewable energy,6 some have
called into question the ability of the aging grid to suit the demands of
today’s society, identifying the need to improve the efficiency of
power delivery and the incorporation of renewable energy
technologies as necessary requisites for the electrical grid of
tomorrow.7
This “grid of tomorrow” will rely upon the near-instantaneous
communication of information made possible by the Internet. Wiring
the antiquated grid to the Internet, however, will expose existing
vulnerabilities and create entirely new ones.8 Recent attacks on other
utilities around the world, as well as institutions traditionally
perceived as being secure from cyber attacks such as banks and stock
markets, underscore the reality and imminence of these threats.9
Cyber attackers can remotely engage in wrongdoing from anywhere
in the world using Internet connections, and their profiles are diverse,

3. In 2003, the Department of Energy described the electrical grid as “aging,
inefficient, and congested, and incapable of meeting future energy needs of the
Information Economy without operational changes and substantial capital
investment over the next several decades.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, “GRID 2030:” A
NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100 YEARS, at iii (2003), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Electric_Vision_Docu
ment.pdf.
4. The average power generating station was built in the 1960s and uses even
older technology, while the average substation transformer is forty-two years old with
a designed maximum life of forty years. LEXINGTON INST., ENSURING THE
RESILIENCE OF THE U.S. ELECTRICAL GRID 23 (2013), available at
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Postal/EnsuringResilienceofUS
ElectricalGrid.pdf.
5. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2012 STATE OF RELIABILITY 10 (2012),
http://www.nerc.com/files/2012_sor.pdf.
6. “The Obama Administration has called for doubling the amount of U.S.
electricity produced by renewable sources, such as wind and solar power, during the
next three years to reduce greenhouse emissions that cause global warming.” Tom
Doggett, U.S. Electric Grid Needs Major Overhaul: Utility, REUTERS, Jul. 23, 2009,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/24/us-usa-electricity-grididUSTRE56N0HQ20090724.
7. See id.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part II.A.
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ranging from lone hackers to ominous, well-funded government
institutions.10
While the United States has undertaken efforts to address
cybersecurity through legislation and executive action, those efforts
have been inadequate in establishing standards for how
communications between devices and systems in the complex “Smart
Grid”11 will be secured.12 Current legislation directs federal agencies
However, no
to establish these “interoperability standards.”13
mandatory standards have been established and it is unclear from
relevant statutory language if the applicable agencies have any true
enforcement authority.14
Implementation of interoperability
standards by Smart Grid participants is currently performed on a
purely voluntary basis.15
The Internet connection required to enable the real-time
information exchange that the Smart Grid’s devices, technologies,
and services will rely upon allows for new digital access points to our
nation’s electrical grid that might be exploited by cyber attackers.16
The prospect of such infiltration poses a substantial risk to national
security. The same Smart Grid features will also allow for the
collection of massive amounts of private consumer data that can
detail how, when, and where power is consumed in the home. Illicit
interception of this data raises significant personal security and
privacy concerns. Allowing the standards that would minimize these
national security, personal security, and privacy concerns to remain

10. See infra Part II.B.
11. The “Smart Grid” is a term used to describe the United States electrical grid
after the incorporation of the new technologies, devices, and services, see infra Part
I.B, that are designed to build upon and transform the traditional electric grid, see
infra Part I.A. It is also used, at times, to encompass the public and private entities
that, as a group, enable the functionality of these technologies, devices, and services.
These modernization efforts are ongoing. The Smart Grid is in many ways a term of
aspiration; its prevalence is a matter of increasing degree.
12. See generally infra Parts III, V.A.1.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See generally infra Parts III, V.A.1.
15. Because no interoperability standards have been promulgated under
applicable legislation and the agency with the responsibility of implementing such
standards (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) interpreted its legislativelydelegated power as not including the ability to promulgate enforceable standards, any
private organization’s implementation of interoperability standards constitutes
voluntary action. Id.
16. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
INTRODUCTION TO NISTIR 7628 GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY 7
(2010), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf
(source document contains an introduction and three distinct volumes).

2014]

SECURING THE SMART GRID

1353

voluntary and unenforceable leaves the electrical grid and citizens
vulnerable to harm. This Note explores these dangers and discusses
why granting the appropriate regulatory entities the authority to
develop and institute mandatory, enforceable interoperability
standards is the most appropriate means to achieving effective Smart
Grid cybersecurity.
Part I of this Note describes the key characteristics of the
“Traditional Grid”17 and the Smart Grid, and sets forth the reasoning
behind the transition to the Smart Grid and the key concerns the
transition raises. Part II discusses the cybersecurity threats to the
Smart Grid by reviewing recent cyber attacks that have affected a
broad array of industries. It also considers the various types of cyber
attackers and how important data and privacy concerns are
implicated in the Smart Grid. Part III reviews legislation and
executive action that has played a key role in establishing the Smart
Grid cybersecurity landscape thus far, as well as the regulatory roles
and authorities this legislation has created.
After Part III
demonstrates that the industry is currently operating in a voluntary
environment free from mandatory government regulations as it
relates to the implementation of interoperability standards, Part IV
discusses an industry-developed standard analogue that is used to
illustrate the possible justifications for, and pitfalls of, such a
standard, ultimately concluding that a voluntary standard regime is an
inappropriate solution for the Smart Grid. Finally, Part V asserts that
a system of federal mandatory enforceable standards applicable to all
Smart Grid participants is the best path to defending the important
national security and privacy interests endangered by the cyber
threats discussed in Part II. It argues that the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)18 is the appropriate federal entity
to develop and issue these mandatory standards. Acknowledging that
legislation reconfiguring and reassigning responsibilities and
authorities in the Smart Grid will be necessary to follow that

17. The “Traditional Grid” is the electrical grid as described in Part I.A without
the Smart Grid technologies, devices, and services described in Part I.B.
18. NIST is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce whose
“mission is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing
measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic
security and improve our quality of life.” NIST General Information, NAT’L INST.
STANDARDS TECH., http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2014). NIST has been tasked with developing information system
standards relevant to this Note under both the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
See infra notes 170–88, 295–300.
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recommended path, Part V concludes with key elements of a
legislative proposal and a depiction of how the resulting regulatory
environment might operate to effectuate better Smart Grid
cybersecurity.
I. THE EVOLVING ELECTRIC GRID
Before analyzing the benefits and challenges of the substantial
transition from the antiquated Traditional Grid to the prospective
Smart Grid, it is important to first assess the composition of each, as
well as their significant points of difference.
A. The Traditional Grid
The Traditional Grid is a phrase used in this Note to depict the
electrical grid as it existed before the recent modernization efforts
that characterize the Smart Grid. While it is conceptually helpful to
conceive of the Traditional Grid as distinct from the Smart Grid in
this manner so that the Smart Grid’s contributions and impact can be
more clearly identified, it is important to note that much of the
Traditional Grid’s infrastructure and regulatory environment persists
today as the foundation upon which change is being enacted.
Therefore, establishing a working understanding of the Traditional
Grid’s composition and unique regulatory features is critical before
expounding the Smart Grid’s novel features and the transitional
issues to which they give rise.

1.

Composition

In the Traditional Grid, the path of electricity is comprised of three
main activities: generation, transmission, and distribution.19
At “generation stations,” electricity is generated through the use of
various fuel sources.20 Sometimes these stations are owned by the
same utilities that serve the end customer, while others are owned by
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), or the customer itself.21 While
electric utility companies today still enjoy status as permissible
“natural monopolies,” prior to the enactment of the Public Utilities

19. U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST
14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 5–6 (2004), available at http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/interimrpt-Aug-14-blkout-03.pdf.
20. Such sources include, for example, nuclear, coal, oil, natural gas, hydro power,
geothermal, photovoltaic, and others. Id.
21. Id.
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Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), utilities were significantly
more vertically integrated.22
Once electricity is generated, it must be transmitted across some
360,000 miles of transmission lines.23
The transmission lines
interconnect throughout the nation at various switching stations and
substations, forming the power “grid.”24 At a final substation the
incoming high-voltage power is “stepped down” to safer levels for
distribution to consumers,25 commonly by way of the familiar
overhead poles and wiring or underground systems.
This generation-to-consumer model operates within a continental
electrical infrastructure. The continental United States is comprised
of three distinct power grids: the “Eastern Interconnection,” the
“Western Interconnection,” and the “Texas Interconnection.”26 The
Eastern Interconnection includes the eastern two-thirds of the nation,
while the Western Interconnection includes the western third, with
the Texas Interconnection serving only most of Texas.27
Each of these Interconnections currently operates independently;
however, efforts are underway to connect all three at the “Tres
Amigas Superstation.”28 Currently, within each interconnection,
electricity flows along the paths of least resistance, is used almost the
instant it is produced, and “flows over virtually all transmission lines
from generators to loads.”29 This means, as the Supreme Court
articulated, “any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes
a part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly moving in interstate
commerce.”30 Therefore, the Tres Amigas Superstation would create
a national pool of energy that can be shared between any and all

22. A vertically integrated entity owns operations in multiple levels of the
electrical supply chain (including generation, transmission, and distribution). See
James D. Elliott, Electric Utility Regulation Reform in New York: Economic
Competitiveness at the Expense of the Environment?, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 281,
285 (1995). PURPA forced utilities to purchase electric power from IPPs and other
“small power production facilities,” increasing competition at this level of the grid
and reducing the degree of monopolistic dominance by utilities in the electricity
industry. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2012); Elliott, supra, at 291–92.
23. INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. & ENERGY RESTORATION, supra note 2.
24. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 6.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Kevin Bullis, Superconductors to Wire a Smarter Grid, MIT TECH. REV.
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/416253/superconductors-towire-a-smarter-grid.
29. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 6.
30. New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 2 (2002).
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states in the continental United States. This pool would allow for
more reliable and less costly distribution of energy, including
renewable energy. For example, the availability of wind energy
would grow less dependent on regional weather,31 and the renewable
energy developed in the wind-blown Texas Panhandle would no
longer be “trapped” in the Texas Interconnection.32

2.

Utilities as Natural Monopolies

Massive fixed-cost capital is required to enter the generation,
transmission, and distribution markets. Both government and private
parties recognized this fact in the Traditional Grid’s early days and
concluded that it would be wasteful of societal resources to allow for
regular competition.33 Thus, a “compact of sorts” was formed
between utilities and the people: utilities would be granted
monopolies over certain geographical regions in exchange for
subjecting themselves to intensive regulation, including rate-setting,
in an arrangement “alien to the free market.”34 Utilities are thus
considered permissible “natural monopolies.”35
Utilities secure designation as natural monopolies from state and
local governments, the right to freedom from local competition, a
guaranteed market base, delegated eminent domain powers,
guaranteed revenues to remain solvent, guaranteed fair rates of
return on prudent capital investments, and lower costs of borrowing
as a result of this bargain.36 At the same time, state governments
retain substantial regulatory oversight and the ability to set prices
(and thus ensure fair and non-discriminatory prices for ratepayers).37
This “compact” is relevant to the focus of this Note because as
electric utilities evolve from their business model of the last century

31. See Karen Uhlenhuth, Tres Amigas Seeks to Break US Grids Out of
Isolation, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/tres-amigas-seeks-to-break-u.s.-grids-out-of-isolation (providing the
example that the wind in Kansas may be producing at different times than the wind in
Texas, and the flexibility provided by the Tres Amigas station would make it possible
to take advantage of that diversity in the weather).
32. See id.
33. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network
Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO.
L. REV. 833, 844–45 (2010).
34. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d
1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35. See Katharine Southard, U.S. Electric Utilities: The First Public-Private
Partnerships?, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 395, 401 (2010).
36. See id. at 402.
37. See Elliott, supra note 22, at 298; Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 845–46.
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to become more diversified businesses engaging in transactions
beyond regional rate schemes, questions regarding the compact’s
validity may rise to the surface. Challenges to traditional monopoly
protections and state jurisdiction may create significant tensions
amongst the Smart Grid stakeholders, especially customers who have
limited, if any, alternative market options should they grow
discontent with their utility’s behavior.
B.

The Smart Grid

While the Smart Grid is developing upon the existing infrastructure
of the Traditional Grid, it has a number of distinguishable features
that both provide significant benefits and present significant
transitional challenges.

1.

Distinguishing Features

NIST identified seven categories of participants—or “domains”—
within the Smart Grid, the first three of which have already been
mentioned: (1) Bulk Generation, (2) Transmission, (3) Distribution,
(4) Customer, (5) Markets, (6) Operations, and (7) Service Provider.38
While electricity only flows between (1) and (4), all domains
exchange digital communications that must be adequately secured.39
Ultimately, the Smart Grid will likely result in dramatic changes to
each domain; however, some of the most distinctive and important
changes will be taking place in the Customer, Markets, Operations,
and Service Provider domains.
In the Customer domain, two types of Smart Grid technologies are
crucial. First, the “Smart Meter” replaces the simpler analog meter
on the side of most homes today and uses digital technology to record
customer consumption information on a frequent basis (potentially
minute-to-minute or greater frequency as technology progresses),
with the information regularly transmitted over the Smart Grid

38. See CYBER SEC. WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 1, SMART GRID CYBER
SECURITY STRATEGY, ARCHITECTURE, AND HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 14 (2010),
[hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1], available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/
upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf (source document contains an introduction and three
distinct volumes).
39. See id. at 14, 17 (identifying unique communication paths—or “logical
interfaces”—between Smart Grid participants).
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network to various entities that can derive value from that
information.40
“Technologies, devices, and services that access and leverage
energy usage information, such as smart appliances that can use
energy data to turn on when energy is cheaper or renewable energy is
available,” represent the second crucial Smart Grid technology in the
Customer domain.41
Smart Appliances are equipped for
communication with Smart Meters and allow for the recording of
extremely granular, appliance-specific consumption data.42
In 2009, Vice President Joe Biden stated in a report to President
Obama that eight million homes had been equipped with Smart
Meters and declared projections of twenty-six million homes by 2013,
and forty million by 2015.43 But in May 2012, almost one-in-three
households had a Smart Meter, with thirty-six million Smart Meters
having been installed, and it was projected that sixty-five million
Smart Meters would be installed by 2015—more than twenty-five
million above Vice President Biden’s 2009 estimate.44 The torrent
pace at which this nascent technology is being deployed underscores
the importance of establishing mandatory interoperability standards
early on to ensure a more secure grid.
In the Markets and Operations domains, it can be expected that
businesses will communicate information “across organizational
boundaries, thus posing trust issues,”45 when, for example, a utility

40. Andreas S.V. Wokutch, The Role of Non-Utility Service Providers in Smart
Grid Development: Should They Be Regulated, and if So, Who Can Regulate
Them?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 531, 534 (2011).
41. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A
POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE
ENERGY FUTURE 1 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf.
42. CYBER SEC. WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 2, PRIVACY AND THE SMART
GRID 27 (2010) [hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2], available at
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf (source document contains
an introduction and three distinct volumes).
43. Memorandum from Joseph Biden, Vice President of the United States, to
Barack Obama, President of the United States 5 (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/administrationofficial/vice_president_memo_on_clean_energy_economy.pdf.
44. INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, UTILITY-SCALE SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS,
PLANS, & PROPOSALS 1 (2012), available at http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/.../
iee_smartmeterrollouts_0512.pdf; INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, UTILITY-SCALE
SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: A FOUNDATION FOR EXPANDED GRID BENEFITS 1–2
(2013), available at http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_Smart
MeterUpdate_0813.pdf; Memorandum, supra note 43, at 5.
45. NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 44.
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shares collected data with marketers or contractors assisting in the
provision of electricity. With the new mass of information that will be
accrued through Smart Grid technologies, it can also be expected that
“many customers, possibly through aggregators or other energy
service providers, will participate in the retail energy market, thus
vastly increasing the number of participants.”46 The Markets and
Operations domains will have to adapt to the advent of these new
entrants in the Service Provider domain.
These “other energy service providers,” also referred to as “Edge
Service Providers” or “Non-Utility Service Providers” (ESPs) will
operate in the Smart Grid not as providers or energy consumers, but
as businesses that “utilize the information produced by advanced
meters and other utility-deployed smart grid technologies in
innovative ways.”47 They might assist consumers in analyzing their
electricity consumption to help eliminate inefficiencies and lower
electrical bills,48 or offer a management system that allows consumers
to control electric usage in their residence remotely in an innovative,
cost-saving manner.49
Essentially, there is no question that the Smart Grid will probably
result in dramatic changes across a transformed electrical industry.
Utilities will perform new functions, ESPs will bypass the utility and
derive their own value from customer consumption data, and utilities
will sell customer information to marketers. Amongst these likely
outcomes, one common theme emerges: massive caches of consumer
data will be generated and communicated via the Internet across
inter- and intra-organizational boundaries and digital channels in a
manner that is alien to the functioning of the Traditional Grid.

46. Id.
47. Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 843 n.27.
48. See Wokutch, supra note 40, at 535–36 (discussing “Electric Efficiency
Analysis” solutions, such as Google’s PowerMeter, which provides an online web
portal for monitoring home energy consumption).
49. One such “Energy Management” solution is AlertMe Energy, which requires
attachment of hardware to the consumer’s electric meter and a broadband hub that
collects and transmits usage data over the Internet to a United Kingdom-based
software company’s cloud-based application, which can read signals from compatible
“smart” appliances, allowing consumers to control the appliances remotely through a
web browser or smartphone. See id. at 536–37; Heather Clancy, AlertMe Supports
Lowe’s Residential Energy Management Platform, GREENTECH PASTURES (July 24,
2012), http://www.zdnet.com/alertme-supports-lowes-residential-energy-management
-platform-7000001494.
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Benefits

The Smart Grid’s benefits are substantial, which Congress
recognized by allocating $4.5 billion for electricity delivery and
energy reliability modernization efforts through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).50
The
Department of Energy (DOE) issued ninety-nine grants totaling $7.8
billion51 through its Smart Grid Investment Grant Program to
accelerate development of the Smart Grid.52
The DOE has identified five primary Smart Grid Technologies that
will provide key benefits of resiliency, reliability, environmental
stewardship,
security,
cost
effectiveness,
and
economic
stability/development: (1) the Smart Grid Network, (2) Advanced
Metering, (3) Phasor Measurement Units, (4) Renewable, Distributed
Power Generation, and (5) Energy Storage.
The Smart Grid Network is characterized by two-way
communications between energy suppliers and customers.53 This
scheme allows customers to transmit near-real-time consumption
information to utilities, while utilities can in turn communicate nearreal-time energy pricing back to consumers.54 Utilities can thus more
effectively monitor and manage electrical loads and demands given
their access to comprehensive “live” data, while allowing customers
to adjust their consumption patterns based on real-time pricing
information.55 Such two-way communication also facilitates more

50. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 2.
51. $3.4 billion originated from ARRA funding, with an additional $4.4 billion
coming from private sector investments. Joseph Paladino, Energy Department’s
Investment Grant Program Advances Rapidly, as Scheduled, IEEE SMART GRID
NEWSLETTER (Feb. 2013), http://smartgrid.ieee.org/february-2013/793-energydepartment-s-investment-grant-program-advances-rapidly-as-scheduled.
52. Id.
53. OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
STUDY OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES OF SMART GRID SYSTEMS—CURRENT CYBER
SECURITY ISSUES 4 (2009), available at http://www.inl.gov/scada/publications/d/
securing_the_smart_grid_current_issues.pdf.
54. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST
FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS,
RELEASE 1.0, at 21 (2010) [hereinafter NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0], available at
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/smartgrid_interoperability_final.
pdf.
55. For example, if prices are highest when demand is at its peak, a customer,
armed with the knowledge of sky-high energy prices at those peaks, may choose to
conserve, allowing for “peak load reduction,” a two-way benefit (price savings and
reduced strain on the grid). See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY,
supra note 53, at 4. The enabling of these customer choices “based on how, when,
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appropriate and proactive utility responses to power outages.56
“Advanced Metering Infrastructure,” including Smart Meters and
Smart Appliances, is central to the realization of these network
benefits.57
Phasor Measurement Units dramatically alter the landscape of the
Bulk Generation and Transmission domains. These pieces of
equipment allow the grid to sense problems quickly and respond
effectively.58 It was perhaps the capabilities of this equipment that
President Obama was alluding to in his 2013 State of the Union
Address when he made reference to the notion of “self-healing power
grids.”59
Enhanced responsiveness in the Smart Grid allows for better
integration of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind
energy sources, which “cannot be turned on or off as needed.”60 A
wired grid engaging in two-way communications and equipped with
high-tech sensors allows the grid to adjust to these inherent variations
in output by drawing energy from other sources when needed.61
and how much electricity they use” is a touted benefit of the Smart Grid. See NIST
GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 3.
56. See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 4–
5.
57. See CYBER SEC. WORKING GRP., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 3, SUPPORTIVE ANALYSES AND
REFERENCES app. F-1 (2010) [hereinafter NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 3], available at
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf (source document contains
an introduction and three distinct volumes). “Advanced Metering Infrastructure”
includes the hardware and software that creates a “bi-directional network” between
advanced metering equipment (e.g., Smart Meters and Smart Appliances) and a
utility’s systems, “enabling collection and distribution of information to customers
and other parties.” Id.
58. Phasor Measurement Units will “enhance the situational awareness of the
national grid and enable system operators to react to system disturbances and
anomalies more accurately and expeditiously.” OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY &
ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 6. These high-tech devices will be placed
throughout the grid and take precise measurements of voltages, currents, and
frequency, communicating that information back to grid operators at high speed. See
id. Combining the data from all Phasors throughout the grid will provide operators
with a comprehensive picture of the nation’s grids in any given area, and by
developing “advanced operating procedures/algorithms,” the data can be used to
allow for automated responses by the grid to stimuli, potentially avoiding or
mitigating power outages, quality problems, and service disruptions. See id.
59. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president
-state-union-address.
60. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 14. For additional information
regarding how Smart Grid technologies will foster the integration of renewable
energy sources, see generally id. at 13–14, 25.
61. See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 6.
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Finally, advances in energy storage technologies mean that, in the
Smart Grid, energy can be stored for later consumption when it is
least expensive to generate, allowing for reduced peak loads. This
reduces strain on the system and increases cost savings.62 Such energy
storage could also serve significant benefits in times of crisis, such as
the August 2003 Northeast blackout63 or 2012’s Hurricane Sandy.
While these substantial benefits offer great promise for consumers,
businesses, and the United States’ energy future, their realization calls
for fundamental changes to the Traditional Grid that present a
number of challenges.
C.

Transition Issues

The Smart Grid carries with it many fundamental changes for a
variety of stakeholders. For the utility industry, it means a transition
from a business model of purely supplying electricity to a hybrid
business model where energy delivery is coupled with other services
revolving around the collection and management of granular
customer consumption data.64 Customers will be presented with new
opportunities to monitor and adjust their electricity consumption.
For ESPs, the Smart Grid presents new business prospects. While
promising in some regards, such unfamiliar activity occurring on such
a large scale in an industry that is inextricably intertwined with
virtually every aspect of everyday life represents a formidable
undertaking.
Utilities face the challenge of first making possible the
sophisticated power-flow management noted above,65 and then
providing that kind of meticulous distribution effectively.66 While the
idea of utilizing live data from Phasor Measurement Units and Smart
Meters to adjust transmission, distribution, and storage of electricity
sounds ideal, it represents a stark contrast from the more
straightforward traditional responsibility of providing energy to meet
demand. The two-way network outlined above necessarily entails
communication between computers, devices, software, and other

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 7.
See id.
See Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 842.
See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text.
See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, app. B-1.
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technologies that present national security threats posed by hackers
and other cyber attackers that did not exist in the Traditional Grid.67
While the customer data noted above will allow for worthwhile
benefits, the Smart Grid will “greatly expand the amount of data that
can be monitored, collected, aggregated, and analyzed,” which will
raise significant privacy concerns.68 Time-stamped dwelling activity
reports being transmitted over the Internet, if intercepted, could
reveal personal and intimate details that may give rise to personal
security concerns, such as a computer-savvy thief detecting when a
dwelling has gone empty for an extended period of time.69
The Smart Grid will allow for enhancements in efficiency and
reliability through the collection of massive amounts of granular data
collected from Smart Meters and various points in the transmission
system. However, if this new Internet-enabled Smart Grid is not
properly secured, access to its systems by wrongdoers could lead to
devastating consequences.
II. THE CYBERSECURITY THREAT
The Smart Grid will rely on Internet connectivity in moving
massive amounts of data through many channels and entities in order
to fully capture the data’s potential value.70 With such extensive
digital communication occurring, the possibility of illicit interception
or manipulation of those communications increases.71 In the Smart
Grid realm, cyber intruders, in many ways, have the upper hand. To
this point, they have been successful in breaching some of the most
secure operations in the world, including electrical utilities, nuclear
programs, an oil company, banks, and a stock exchange.72 While the
popular view of a hacker may be a single computer-savvy individual,
institutional hacking is also prevalent today.73 More sophisticated
67. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 49 (noting that “a smarter
grid includes more devices and connections that may become avenues for intrusions,
error-caused disruptions, malicious attacks, destruction, and other threats”).
68. NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 3, supra note 57, at 19.
69. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 11.
70. See id. at 29–33 (identifying the types of data that can be collected in the
Smart Grid and the different ways in which that data is valuable to interested
parties).
71. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 6 (explaining that as the grid
becomes “smarter” it will contain “more interconnections that may become portals
for intrusions, error-caused disruptions, malicious attacks, and other threats”).
72. See infra Part II.A.
73. See, e.g., Michael Kelley & Geoffrey Ingersoll, How the US Invited Iranian
Hackers to Attack America’s Banks, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-started-worldwide-cyberwar-hacking-2012-
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attacks can be launched with the added resources behind such
operations.74
One issue in responding to these threats is that securing the grid is
expensive. In 2010, Pike Research, a “Cleantech Market Intelligence
Firm,” estimated that in the following five years there would be a
cumulative investment in Smart Grid security of $21 billion,
representing approximately fifteen percent of all Smart Grid capital
investments.75 While these numbers may seem large, some wonder if
enough is being spent. Pike Research stated in a 2011 report that
“[u]tility cyber security is in a state of near chaos. After years of
vendors selling point solutions, utilities investing in compliance
minimums rather than full security, and attackers having nearly free
rein, the attackers clearly have the upper hand.”76 The report cited
the lack of enforceable standards as a reason for the chaos and a
hindrance to action since it causes utilities and vendors to take a
“wait-and-see posture” until the regulatory environment becomes
clearer, rather than act now and risk “losing their entire investment if
future laws invalidate their approach.”77
Conversely, cyber attacks can be relatively inexpensive to execute.
This is because the “defense needs to be strong everywhere, while the
offense only needs to succeed in one place;” once a hacker gains
access to a network, the whole network may be compromised if the
breach goes undetected or insufficient procedures are in place to
quarantine the breach.78 This concern is important to the Smart Grid,
where the communication network will become increasingly complex
in both the Operations and Service Provider domains, increasing the

10#ixzz2HhqDtUMP (reporting that more than one hundred-forty countries are
actively developing cyber-espionage and warfare capabilities).
74. See, e.g., Lee Ferran, Edward Snowden: U.S., Israel ‘Co-Wrote’ Cyber Super
Weapon Stuxnet, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
headlines/2013/07/edward-snowden-u-s-israel-co-wrote-cyber-super-weapon-stuxnet
(stating that some cyber weapons are so sophisticated and expensive that
cybersecurity experts believe they can only be attributable to nations).
75. See Smart Grid Cyber Security Market to Reach $3.7 Billion by 2015,
According
to
Pike
Research,
BUS.
WIRE
(June
23,
2010),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100623005613/en/Smart-Grid-CyberSecurity-Market-Reach-3.7.
76. PIKE RESEARCH, UTILITY CYBER SECURITY: SEVEN KEY SMART GRID
SECURITY TRENDS TO WATCH IN 2012 AND BEYOND 1 (2011), available at
http://www.navigantresearch.com/wp-assets/uploads/2011/11/UCS-11-PikeResearch.pdf.
77. See id. at 5.
78. Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 416, 455 (2012).

2014]

SECURING THE SMART GRID

1365

system’s vulnerability with added access points.79 Additionally,
operators and consumers will seek to control equipment (valves and
switches for utilities, appliances for consumers) remotely through the
Internet—types of remote connections that could “allow[] attackers a
gateway into the system.”80 The damage that can be caused by this
type of breach was demonstrated in 2007, when the Department of
Homeland Security performed the staged “Aurora” experimental
remote attack on a generator that was part of a replicated power
plant’s control system.81 Researchers were able to “change[] the
operating cycle of the generator, sending it out of control.”82 In a
released video, the generator jerks violently several times before the
equipment begins to fail, ultimately releasing massive amounts of
white and black smoke upon its destruction.83
The Aurora
experiment would come to foreshadow malicious cyber attacks on
various institutions all over the world.
A. Recent Attacks
The staged Aurora attack perhaps marked the first moment of
widespread public awareness that digital communication in critical
infrastructure operations was a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, it offers cost savings, convenience, and efficiency, but on the
other hand, it creates dangerous vulnerabilities. Although the
implications of Aurora were frightening, there was skepticism that
such an attack could or would happen outside a staged environment.84
That perception would quickly change with the onset of cyber attacks
on various energy companies.
79. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 49 (suggesting that a
smarter grid’s “[n]etworks of computers, intelligent electronic devices, software, and
communication technologies present greater infrastructure protection challenges
than those of the traditional infrastructure” as they “may become avenues for
intrusions, error-caused disruptions, malicious attacks, destruction, and other
threats”).
80. Ellen Nakashima & Steven Mufson, Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities,
CIA Analyst Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011803277_pf.html.
81. The “Aurora” experiment was conducted in March of 2007 at the Department
of Energy’s Idaho lab. See Jeanne Meserve, Sources: Staged Cyber Attack Reveals
Vulnerability in Power Grid, CNN (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/
09/26/power.at.risk.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Meserve, supra note 81 (“Despite all the warnings and worry, there has
not been any publicly known successful cyber-attack against a power plant’s control
system. And electric utilities have paid more attention to electronic risks than many
other industries, adopting voluntary cyber-standards.”).

1366

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

In 2008, computer hackers targeting countries other than the
United States “literally turned out the lights in multiple cities after
breaking into electrical utilities and demanding extortion payments
before disrupting the power.”85 Later that year, a power company
hired a “penetration-testing consultant” to test the company’s cyber
security. The test had to be shut down within hours because the
hacking operation was “working too well,” with experts citing the
power company’s system’s Internet connectivity as the key
vulnerability.86
In 2010, the “Stuxnet” computer virus damaged Iran’s nuclear
program by infiltrating its Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
system (SCADA).87 At one point, the virus temporarily disabled
approximately one-fifth of the plant’s centrifuges, which were
spinning to purify uranium.88 While the New York Times reported
that the United States and Israel developed the virus,89 neither
country’s government has officially acknowledged such involvement.90
In 2011, the “Night Dragon” cyber attacks targeted global oil,
energy, and petrochemical companies, and were believed to have
originated in the Shandong Province of China.91 Also discovered in
2011 was the “Duqu” virus, thought to be an offshoot of Stuxnet, that
was aimed more at information gathering than destruction of

85. Ted Bridis, CIA: Hackers Demanding Cash Disrupted Power, NBC NEWS
(Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22734229/#.Ulwg5bQvYb6.
86. A hired consultant explained that the heart of utility operations known as
SCADA used to be designed as a closed system; however, intranets and the Internet
have now been integrated into SCADA, making it vulnerable to cyber attacks. The
consultant and his team sent an e-mail to firm employees about a plan to cut their
benefits and included a link to “find out more.” When that link was clicked, the
employee’s computer downloaded malware that enabled the consultants to take
control of the machine, providing them “full system control.” Tim Greene, Experts
Hack Power Grid in No Time, NETWORKWORLD.COM (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/040908-rsa-hack-power-grid.html.
87. STAFF OF CONGRESSMEN EDWARD J. MARKEY & HENRY A. WAXMAN,
ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: INDUSTRY RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 23
available at http://democrats.
(2013)
[hereinafter
MARKEY REPORT],
energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report-Electric-GridVulnerability-2013-5-21.pdf. For more on SCADA and its importance to power plant
operations, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. See David E. Sanger, Obama Ordered Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks
Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1.
89. See id.
90. See Ferran, supra note 74.
91. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., INDUSTRY ADVISORY: “NIGHT DRAGON”
(2011),
http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2011-02-1801%20Night%20Dragon%20FINAL.pdf.
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industrial control systems.92 In 2012, the “Shamoon” virus infected
the Saudi Arabian State Oil Company, known as “Aramco,”
destroying more than 30,000 computers using a code known as a
“wiper” that essentially erased all of the data on the computer’s hard
drives, rendering them useless and irreparable.93
At the time of Aurora, electric utilities gave the impression that
efforts were at least being considered to enhance cybersecurity
through the adoption of “voluntary” cyber standards.94
One
economist suggested that of all the industries, perhaps only banking,
finance, and telecommunications had better cybersecurity than the
electric industry.95 Attacks on these perceived security stalwarts in
the following years would reinforce the seriousness of the threat of
cyber attacks.
One such stalwart, Citibank, was hacked in 2008. Three hackers
pled guilty to hacking Citibank ATM card numbers and Personal
Identification Numbers to steal $2 million from customer accounts
over a period of four months.96 In 2011, hackers gained access to the
data of hundreds of thousands of Citigroup’s credit card customers in
North America, with one member of the hacker group
“Anonymous”97 describing Citigroup’s 128-bit encryption used to
protect electronic customer information as “really not that big a
deal . . . . The security is so weak right now, if you know a couple
attacks, you can just go around and see what works.”98 In October of
2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta remarked that the
“scale and speed” with which large U.S. financial institutions were

92. See MARKEY REPORT, supra note 87, at 24.
93. See id. at 5; Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Warns Industry of Heightened Risk of
Cyberattack, WASH. POST, May 9, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0509/world/39139314_1_senior-u-s-oil-and-gas-companies-iran.
94. See Meserve, supra note 81.
95. See id. (quoting Economist Scott Borg who, at the time, produced securityrelated data for the federal government of the United States).
96. Kevin Poulsen, Three Plead Guilty in $2 Million Citibank ATM Caper,
WIRED (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/11/three-plead-gui.
97. “Anonymous” is an “informal hacker collective that often targets groups or
countries it sees as enemies of Internet freedom.” Max Fisher, Hacker Group
Anonymous Is No Match for North Korea, WASH. POST, June 27, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/27/hacker-groupanonymous-is-no-match-for-north-korea.
98. Chris V. Nicholson & Eric Dash, Citi Says Credit Card Customers’ Data Was
Hacked, DEALBOOK (June 9, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
06/09/citigroup-card-customers-data-hacked/?_r=0.
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being hacked was “unprecedented.”99 Attacks in 2012 caused major
disruptions to the “online banking sites of Bank of America,
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, PNS, Capital One, Fifth Third
Bank, BB&T and HSBC.”100
In 2013, Citibank was hacked again, along with PNC Bank.101 The
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
indicated that the hack was allegedly achieved through the use of
malware and other targeted cyber attacks, allowing the attackers to
steal “hundreds of thousands of bank account numbers, PIN numbers,
and other codes to withdraw millions of dollars from victim
accounts.”102 The same defendants allegedly hacked NASDAQ by
installing malware on NASDAQ servers, allowing them to access the
infected servers and “execute commands on those servers, including
commands to delete, change, or steal data.”103
Security breaches over the last six years on energy facilities,
financial institutions, and other organizations have demonstrated that
individuals and entities possess the knowledge and means to launch
successful cyber attacks. The attackers’ identities and motives are
diverse and should be considered in assessing the nature of the threat
to Smart Grid security.
B.

Profile of the Attackers

Different parties carry out cyber attacks for different reasons. In
2012, Verizon published a “Data Breach Investigations Report” (the
Verizon Report), which provided several useful frameworks for
understanding the various types of cyber attackers, their methods of
choice, and their underlying motivations.104

99. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, Remarks on Cybersecurity to the
Business Executives for National Security (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136.
100. Nicole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacking Was the Work of Iranians,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at B1.
101. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S.
Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge Announce Charges Against Russian
National for Hacking Nasdaq Servers (July 25, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/KalininandNasenkovIndictment
sPR.php.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. VERIZON, 2012 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (2012), available at
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigationsreport-2012_en_xg.pdf (follow “download” hyperlink).
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In analyzing 855 breach incident cases,105 the Verizon Report found
that 98% of breaches were performed by external agents, 4% by
internal agents, and less than 1% by partner agents.106 The most
commonly employed methods of attack included malware (69% of
breaches) and hacking (81% of breaches).107 In assessing the
underlying motivations for attacks, the Verizon Report concluded
that 96% of breaches—when considering the entire pool of
organizations affected—were motivated at least in part by “Financial
or Personal Gain,” while “Disagreement or Protest,” “Fun, Curiosity,
or Pride,” and “Grudge or Personal Offense” were cited as
motivations in less than 4% of each cases.108 When narrowing the
scope of review to cases involving large organizations, “Financial or
Personal Gain” was still a factor in many attacks (71%), however,
“Disagreement or Protest” and “Fun, Curiosity, or Pride” played a
much larger role in attacking these entities (a motivating factor in
25% and 23% of cases, respectively).109
The Verizon Report demonstrates that financial or personal gain is
very often a motivating factor in breaches, which is concerning within
the context of the Smart Grid, where a primary goal is the generation
of large caches of valuable—and what many would consider private—
data. Disagreement, protest, or curiosity are likely motivating factors
behind some of the troubling state-sponsored hacking groups, such as
the Chinese organization known as the “Comment Crew,” which is
believed to be run either by Chinese army officers or government
contractors.110 Recently, concerns have risen that the goals of the
Comment Crew are shifting from stealing data to manipulation of
American critical infrastructure, including the power grid.111
105. These 855 incidents resulted in a collective 174 million compromised records.
The breach incident data was accumulated by Verizon with contributions from a
number of organizations, including the United States Secret Service, Dutch National
High Tech Crime Unit, Australian Federal Police, Irish Reporting & Information
Security Service, and London Metropolitan Police. Id. at 2.
106. See id. at 3. External threat agents are sources outside of the breached
organization and its network of partners. See id. at 16. These include both entities
(e.g., former employees or criminal groups) and environmental events (e.g., floods or
earthquakes). Internal threat agents are sources within the breached organization,
such as executives or employees. See id. Partners are third parties sharing a business
relationship with the breached organization (e.g., vendors or outsourced information
technology support). Id.
107. See id. at 3.
108. See id. at 19.
109. See id.
110. David E. Sanger et al., China’s Army Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at A1.
111. See id.; MARKEY REPORT, supra note 87, at 27.
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In June of 2012, it is believed the Comment Crew was behind a
failed “spearphishing”112 attack on Digital Bond, a firm that
specializes in control system security consulting. The attack sought to
trick the recipient into installing a remote-access tool that would have
given attackers control over the recipient’s computer and, ultimately,
access to confidential information about the company’s casework,
which included security consultation information for a power plant
and a major water project.113
Perhaps the most disturbing Comment Crew attack occurred in
September of 2012, when Telvent, a company that designs software
giving oil, gas, and electric grid operators remote access to valves,
switches, and security systems, was successfully infiltrated.114 The
attackers used malware and were able to take project files.115 Telvent
cut off access before the attackers could take control of any
systems.116 An employee of Digital Bond said that such an attack is
“terrifying” since access to a vendor such as Telvent is the “holy
grail” when it comes to acquiring the capability to take out critical
systems.117
President Obama addressed these events with a call to action
during his 2013 State of the Union Address: “Now our enemies
are . . . seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial
institutions, our air traffic control systems. We cannot look back
years from now and wonder why we did nothing . . . .”118

112. “Spearphising” is an attack that targets individuals or groups with messages
that are designed to seem to originate from a trusted source in an attempt to trick
users into performing an act, such as clicking a link or opening an attachment, that
would contain a malicious code that allows the attacker to obtain confidential
information or unauthorized access to the user’s network. See N. AM. ELEC.
RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 91.
113. See Sanger et al., supra note 110. For more information on the Digital Bond
attack and a screenshot of the illegitimate message, see Reid Wightman, Spear
Phishing Attempt, DIGITAL BOND (June 7, 2012), https://www.digitalbond.com/blog/
2012/06/07/spear-phishing-attempt.
114. See Sanger et al., supra note 110. Telvent was in possession of “detailed
blueprints on more than half of all the oil and gas pipelines in North and South
America, and ha[d] access to their systems.” See id.
115. See Brian Krebs, Chinese Hackers Blamed for Intrusion at Energy Industry
Giant Telvent, KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 25, 2012), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/
09/chinese-hackers-blamed-for-intrusion-at-energy-industry-giant-telvent.
It was
reported that the attack spanned Telvent operations in the United States, Canada,
and Spain. Id. The stolen project files “related to one of [Telvent’s] core offerings—
OASyS SCADA—a product that helps energy firms mesh older information
technology assets with more advanced ‘smart grid’ technologies.” Id.
116. See Sanger et al., supra note 110.
117. See id.
118. President Barack Obama, supra note 59.
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Data, Privacy, and the Impact on Cybersecurity

The novel operational characteristics of the Smart Grid—
particularly utilities’ capacity to maintain detailed records of
customers’ electric energy consumption—give rise to significant
privacy concerns that are difficult, if not impossible, for concerned
customers to avoid.

1.

Smart Grid Privacy Concerns

Barriers in the Traditional Grid that greatly diminished the value
of energy consumption pattern data—and thus public concern with its
collection—will not exist in the Smart Grid.119 Utilities will no longer
need to send a person or crew to read home meters; data will be
transmitted electronically over the Internet.120 Previously, not much
value could be derived from monthly (or more infrequent) meter
readings; in the Smart Grid, readings will now be taken multiple times
daily.121 Further, those readings will be far different from the lumpsum energy readings in the Traditional Grid; usage data could be
available on a granular appliance-by-appliance level.122
While such changes can be characterized as beneficial access that
will allow utilities to more efficiently deliver energy and services, they
are also more intrusive on personal privacy. We live in an
information-sharing age in which choices to share information are
often deliberate and voluntary; however, in the Smart Grid, it is not
so apparent that this same sense of “choice” will exist.123 In resisting
such sharing, the option of living without an essential utility such as
electricity may not be a feasible option at all.124
NIST, in carrying out its responsibilities under the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),125 developed a
Privacy Subgroup to focus primarily on privacy within personal
dwellings and electric vehicles.126 One conclusion that the Privacy
119. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 9.
120. See id. at 2.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See generally Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 199, 216–17 (2011).
124. See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.KENT L. REV. 161, 174–75 (2011).
125. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 17385, it is the “primary responsibility” of the
Director the NIST to “coordinate the development of a framework that includes
protocols and model standards for information management to achieve
interoperability of smart grid devices and systems.” 42 U.S.C. § 17385 (2012).
126. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 2.
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Subgroup reached was that “[m]ost consumers probably do not
understand their privacy exposures or their options for mitigating
those exposures within the Smart Grid.”127 The Smart Grid reaches
into the intimate goings-on of homes and businesses in ways that the
Traditional Grid never had.128 As Cheryl Dancey Balough articulates
the issue, “The ability to get rich data from the smart meters,
however, might also just be the smart grid’s Achilles’ heel [from a
privacy viewpoint].”129
With such detailed energy consumption information being
transmitted over the Internet, there is the threat that it can be
intercepted by a criminal looking to spy on others to, for example,
determine when a family has gone to sleep or embarked on a
vacation, or to blackmail top officials.130 Free market supporters may
suggest that it is the consumer’s responsibility to educate him or
herself on the privacy implications and, once so educated, make an
informed decision as to whether or not he or she wishes to participate
in the Smart Grid by utilizing its technologies. Faced with threats to
privacy posed by Smart Grid technologies like Smart Meters and
Smart Appliances, do consumers really have a meaningful choice in
deciding whether to use these technologies and expose themselves to
such privacy threats?

2.

The “Illusion of Choice” in Smart Meter Installation

Smart Meters, especially operating in conjunction with Smart
Appliances that wirelessly communicate how much energy they are
consuming and when,131 can “reveal much more detailed information
about the activities within a dwelling or other premises than was
available in the past.”132 Privy to this reality, customers across the

127. Id.
128. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 75 (“As the Smart Grid
reaches into homes and businesses, and as customers increasingly participate in
managing their energy, confidentiality and privacy of their information has
increasingly become a concern. Unlike power system reliability, customer privacy is a
new issue.”).
129. See Balough, supra note 124, at 163–64.
130. In 2005, it was reported that “someone with inside access” to the cellphone
company, Vodafone, had “been bugging more than 100 high-ranking government
officials and dignitaries including the prime minister of Greece, his wife, and the
Mayor of Athens.” John Markoff, Engineers as Counterspies: How the Greek
Cellphone
System
Was
Bugged,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
10,
2007,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/engineers-as-counterspys-how-the-greekcellphone-system-was-bugged.
131. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 27.
132. See id. at 13.
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nation have taken issue with their inability to “opt out” of Smart
Meter installations at their home, preferring instead to maintain their
current mechanical meter and the status quo if possible.133
Some Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs), such as Maine’s, have
ordered utilities to make opting out an option for customers, but have
allowed utilities to charge customers a fee to exercise this option—a
policy that has also met resistance.134 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine recently held in Friedman v. Public Utilities Commission that
utilities retain discretion as to what equipment is used in conjunction
with their provision of services.135 The court held that the customers
permitted the utility to choose what meter it would use “by virtue of
their agreement to purchase service from [the utility].”136 Thus,
utilities could swap out a mechanical meter for a Smart Meter at their
discretion unless the customer elected to opt out of the installation, in
which case an opt-out fee would be imposed. One problem with the
contractual argument the court set forth in this case is that since
utilities operate in a monopolistic environment free from local
competitors,137 a utility contract can take on an adhesive “take-it-orleave-it” character, leaving residents with no option to choose
another electric energy provider and questionable legal recourse
despite their legitimate privacy concerns.

133. See Where Smart Meters are Optional/Free or Free, CENTER FOR
ELECTROSMOG PREVENTION, http://www.electrosmogprevention.org/stop-ca-smartmeter-news/where-smart-meters-are-optional (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (providing
resources and discussions of opt-out policies and legislation in various states).
134. The penalized customers have argued that incentives for “opting in,” as
opposed to penalties for “opting out,” given the nature of their health and privacy
concerns, would be more appropriate. See Ten-Person Complaint Pursuant to 35-A
M.R.S.A. Section 1302 Regarding “Smart Meters” & “Smart Meter” Opt-Out as
Promulgated by the Maine Public Utilities Commission (MPUC), No. 2011-00262
(Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2011). In California, PG&E has instituted a similar
opt-out fee policy, claiming that the fees are to cover installing analog meters in
homes that already had Smart Meters installed but want to switch back, as well as
worker wages for monthly meter readings since it would not be “fair to expect
neighbors who keep their SmartMeters to have to pay for the cost of the meter
reader.” Dana Hull, PG&E Customers Can Opt Out of SmartMeters—For $75, Plus
$10 a Month, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 1, 2012, http://www.mercurynews.com/
breaking-news/ci_19869073.
135. Friedman v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 48 A.3d 794 (Me. 2012).
136. Id. at 801. The Terms and Conditions gave the utility the right to select and
alter the metering equipment used in conveying electricity to the customer, as well as
the right to access the customer’s property to inspect, repair, or remove the utility’s
property. Id.
137. Utilities are considered natural monopolies and are permitted to operate free
from local competition as a result of a compact with state governments that will carry
over from the Traditional Grid. See supra Part I.A.
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Even if Smart Meters are financially imposed upon consumers in
this manner, some may argue that consumers still have a free market
choice that will allow them to avoid this privacy exposure: they can
refuse to purchase the Smart Appliances that communicate
appliance-specific data to Smart Meters. Unfortunately, this solution
is not very effective given the inferences that can be drawn from the
granular data accumulated by Smart Meters.
Customer electrical consumption activities can be inferred due to
one crucial difference between the utility’s mechanical meter in the
Traditional Grid and the Smart Meter: the frequency with which
meter readings are taken. In the Traditional Grid, a utility employee
might have recorded readings monthly.138 Meanwhile, Smart Meters
are designed to allow for readings in fifteen-minute intervals, if not
less.139 Even if the Smart Meters did not communicate with Smart
Appliances and only recorded lump sum electrical consumption, the
frequency with which the data is recorded allows for inferences as to
what types of appliances are being used based on what is known
about the manner in which different appliances consume electricity.140
If Smart Appliances that communicate directly with Smart Meters
become more popular in households, they would only remove the
need for such inference. The revealing data would then be conveyed
over the Internet to utilities and possibly other Smart Grid
participants like ESPs, insurance companies, or marketers.141 Strong
cybersecurity is necessary to prevent illicit interception of that data.
Government efforts to gain access to these detailed records for
investigatory purposes have also raised significant issues. In addition

138. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 13–14.
139. Id.
140. Appliances produce “signatures” that allow someone analyzing an otherwise
anonymous set of data to identify when certain appliances are being used. See NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 16, at 19. The signatures are created by the
unique manner in which certain appliances consume energy. Research has indicated
that a review of electricity consumption data for appliance signatures can reveal
when, throughout the day, a refrigerator comes on, a kettle is activated, a toaster is
used, clothes are washed, and an oven is preheating. See ELIAS L. QUINN, SMART
METERING & PRIVACY: EXISTING LAW AND COMPETING POLICIES 3 (2009), available
at http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/DocketsDecisions/DocketFilings/09I-593EG/09I593EG_Spring2009Report-SmartGridPrivacy.pdf. NIST documentation suggests
that “[a]s the time intervals between smart meter data collection points decreases,
appliance use will be inferable from overall utility usage data and other Smart Grid
data with even greater accuracy.” See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 14.
141. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 29–33.
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to Fourth Amendment concerns,142 NIST, journalists, and scholars
have demonstrated how efforts by the government to legally require
that Internet communication providers build “backdoors” into their
communication systems to enable government wiretapping, if
successful, would increase the vulnerability of Internet
communication networks like the Smart Grid.143 These government

142. For thorough and insightful discussions of the Smart Grid’s Fourth
Amendment implications, see generally Balough, supra note 124; McNeil, supra note
123.
143. NIST documentation has noted that “[c]urrent law both protects private
electronic communications and permits government access to real-time and stored
communications, as well as communications transactional records,” citing the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act as an example. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL.
2, supra note 42, at 12. Those documents also cited a law important to the Smart
Grid Fourth Amendment discussion known as the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires “telecommunications carriers and
equipment manufacturers . . . to design their systems to enable lawful access to
communications.” Id. In addition to the Fourth Amendment concerns related to
government surveillance of in-home activities such a law raises, the law could also
lead to system vulnerabilities. By building in “back doors” for government
wiretapping, access points are created where none existed before, and wrongdoers
who successfully gain access to them can exploit them in malicious ways. A New
York Times article cited an instance in Greece where it was “discovered that hackers
had taken advantage of a legally mandated wiretap function to spy on top officials’
phones, including the prime minister’s.” Charles Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier
to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
09/27/us/27wiretap.html?_r=1&. For more on the Greek scandal, see generally
Markoff, supra note 130; Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair:

How Some Extremely Smart Hackers Pulled Off the Most Audacious Cell-Network
Break-In Ever, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 29, 2007), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/
security/the-athens-affair.
It has been noted that while some communications service providers are
beyond CALEA’s reach, federal law enforcement officials have been seeking new
legislation that would require Internet communication providers to similarly establish
“back doors” so that companies like BlackBerry, Facebook, Skype, and e-mail
providers would be technically capable of complying with a wiretap order. See
Savage, supra. The two-way communication central to Smart Grid functionality
could foreseeably qualify utilities as Internet communication providers under the
desired law. The result “would include being able to intercept and unscramble
encrypted messages . . . . Several privacy and technology advocates argued that
requiring interception capabilities would create holes that would inevitably be
exploited by hackers.” Id.
More recent reports have indicated that the FBI is growing impatient with
legislative delays in creating CALEA-like requirements for Internet communication
providers and is “quietly pushing its plan to force surveillance backdoors on social
networks, VoIP, and Web e-mail providers . . . asking Internet companies not to
oppose a law making those backdoors mandatory.” Declan McCullagh, FBI: We
Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now, CNET (May 4, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/
8301-1009_3-57428067-83/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now/?part=rss&subj=
news&tag=title.
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efforts to wiretap digital communications create additional privacy
and security concerns that consumers may wish to avoid by choosing
not to utilize Smart Meters or Smart Appliances, only to discover that
they lack the ability to freely exercise such choices.
Should states follow Maine’s approach of relying upon contract
language in granting utility companies the discretion to choose
metering equipment, the monopolistic nature of the Traditional Grid
would leave consumers without a meaningful choice in using Smart
Meters, unless they choose to bear a penalty for opting out. Even in a
state where there is no charge for opting out144 or an “opt in” program
is established, an increase in popularity of the Smart Grid and the
prevalence of its technologies may make older technologies obsolete,
indirectly pushing hesitant consumers into the Smart Grid over
time.145 Refusing to purchase Smart Appliances does not solve the
problem because the increased frequency of consumption recordings
allows for inferences of appliance usage. Whether consumers
participate in the Smart Grid by choice or by compulsion, there
should be a uniform, mandated approach to securing their
consumption data given the intimate, private details it can reveal;
details of the sort that should not be compromised by advancements
in technology.146
III. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY: THE CURRENT
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Congress and the Obama Administration have demonstrated an
awareness of the dangers that cybersecurity vulnerabilities pose to
national security and, in response, have factored these concerns into

For additional information regarding “backdoors” and the vulnerabilities they
can create in otherwise secured systems, see Swire & Ahmad, supra note 78.
144. Utilities in Vermont have been prohibited from charging customers Smart
Meter opt-out fees. See Vermont Legislature Eliminates Smart Meter Opt-Out Fee,
WAKE UP, OPT OUT! (May 8, 2012), http://wakeupoptout.org/2012/05/vermontlegislature-eliminates-smart-meter-opt-out-fee.
145. As one scholar notes, even if a customer could legally opt out of the Smart
Meter program, “his or her choice can in practice only be honored so long as their
chosen alternative remains both available and technologically compatible with the
electric grid, which is itself also in transition.” McNeil, supra note 123, at 201 n.20.
146. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the threat to privacy posed by
advancements in technology. In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the obtaining of information by sense-enhancing thermal imaging technology that
could not otherwise be obtained except by physical intrusion constituted an unlawful
search, and noted that “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details, because the
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)
(emphasis in original).

2014]

SECURING THE SMART GRID

1377

legislation, executive orders, and project funding requirements.
However, these responses have been inadequate in the Smart Grid
context. In an industry as fast-moving as the Smart Grid, mandatory
interoperability standards must be established early if they are going
to be established at all. Instead, a voluntary adoption regime persists
to the potential detriment of citizens and businesses.147
While a self-regulatory model148 can be effective in regulating an
industry, the model established through the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPAct)149 (which amended the Federal Power Act (FPA)) to
develop mandatory reliability standards does not fully address Smart
Grid cybersecurity from the interoperability perspective.
The
separate regulatory relationship established between NIST and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the EISA to
implement interoperability standards is too burdensome and inactive
to appropriately account for the fast-moving nature of Smart Grid
development.150
While all interoperability standards remain
voluntary, utilities will continue to pick and choose what standards to
abide by, often opting for minimum security to save money. Profit
generators, such as Smart Grid technologies, will likely continue to be
produced amongst a patchwork of inconsistent state and/or industry
interoperability standards, rendering the Smart Grid highly
vulnerable to cyber attacks.151

147. As noted by the NIST, “Without standards, there is the potential for
these . . . investments to become obsolete prematurely or to be implemented without
measures necessary to ensure security.” NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0, supra note
54, at 7.
148. A self-regulatory model is one in which the industry to be regulated develops
the standards that will eventually regulate it. See DAVID DOLEZILEK & LAURA
HUSSEY, REQUIREMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS? SORTING OUT NERC CIP, NIST,
AND DOE CYBERSECURITY 2 (2011), available at https://www.selinc.com/literature/
TechnicalPapers. The reliability standard development process is a self-regulatory
model by which the industry develops the standards that regulate it; however, FERC
retains the final decision-making authority over whether or not to promulgate the
standards. Id.
149. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (portions relevant
to this Note codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 16 of the United States
Code.).
150. See infra Part V.A.1–2.
151. As noted previously, “defense needs to be strong everywhere, while the
offense only needs to succeed in one place,” and inconsistent security protocols run
contrary to the coherent defense-in-depth strategy that is necessary. See Swire &
Ahmad, supra note 78.
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A. FERC, NERC, and the Mandatory Reliability Standard
Development Process
Under section 215 of the EPAct,152 Congress granted FERC the
authority to develop mandatory standards aimed at ensuring the
reliability of the “bulk-power system.”153 “Reliability standards”
include requirements for “existing bulk-power system facilities,
including cybersecurity protection, and the design of planned
additions or modifications to such facilities.”154 The “bulk-power
system” includes “facilities and control systems necessary for
operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network”
and “electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain
transmission system reliability.”155 Notably, the “bulk-power system”
excludes “facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.”156
The statute further directed FERC to certify an “Electric
Reliability Organization” (ERO) to “establish and enforce reliability
standards for the bulk-power system, subject to [FERC] review.”157
In 2006, FERC certified the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) as the ERO. NERC’s principal members are
owners, operators, and users of the bulk-power system.158 Once
NERC has developed a reliability standard,159 it submits it to FERC
for approval. If FERC disapproves of a standard in whole or in part,
it is not given statutory authority to unilaterally modify the standard;

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012).

Id.

§ 824o(a)(3).
§ 824o(a)(1)(A)–(B).
§ 824o(a)(1).
§ 824o(a)(2) & (c).
H.R. REP. NO. 111-493, at 9 (2010); see also Key Players, N. AM. ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY
CORP.,
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (indicating that the members of NERC’s
eight Regional Entities include “investor-owned utilities; federal power agencies;
rural electric cooperatives; state, municipal and provincial utilities; independent
power producers; power marketers; and end-use customers”).
159. Approval of a reliability standard, or revision of an existing standard, requires
two things: (1) a quorum of seventy-five percent of the member ballot pool, and (2) a
two-thirds supermajority of the weighted segment of votes cast must be affirmative
(the number of votes cast includes affirmative and negative votes, but excludes
abstentions and non-responses). N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., STANDARD
PROCESSES MANUAL 4–5 (2013), available at http://www.nerc.com/comm/SC/
Documents/Appendix_3A_StandardsProcessesManual.pdf. A reliability standard is
initially drawn up by a “drafting team” comprised of industry experts appointed by
the Standards Committee. See id. at 11. NERC uses a voting formula that “allocates
each industry Segment an equal weight in determining the final outcome of any
Reliability Standard action.” Id. at 4.
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however, it may remand the standard to NERC for further
consideration.160
FERC may also conduct formal rulemaking
proceedings for submitted reliability standards to allow for comment
by other interested parties.161 Ultimately, to establish a mandatory
reliability standard, FERC must determine that the standard, as filed,
is “just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in
the public interest.”162 Once approved by FERC, the reliability
standard becomes mandatory for participants in the bulk-power
system, and enforceable by NERC.163
NERC documentation has suggested that while interoperability
standards operate to ensure free exchange of information in the
Smart Grid without logical barriers, reliability standards put barriers
in place to protect the critical infrastructure assets of the bulk power
system.164 It has also indicated that NERC’s understanding of the
mandate set forth under 16 U.S.C. § 824o places the focus of
reliability standards more on physical aspects of the grid, including
“installed equipment” and “the operation and maintenance of cyber
assets.”165 Reliability standards shape the behavior of “asset owners
and operators,” not “equipment and system designers, manufacturers,
and integrators.”166 Notably, NERC documentation indicates that
NERC does not believe that reliability standards are intended to
“specifically protect telecommunications systems or communications
paths,”167 underscoring the need for interoperability standards.
B.

NIST and the Interoperability Standard Development
Process

Under EISA,168 NIST was given the “primary responsibility” of
developing and coordinating a framework for “interoperability of
smart grid devices and systems” that would “contribute to an

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See § 824o(d)(4).
See DOLEZILEK & HUSSEY, supra note 148, at 2.
See § 824o(d)(2).

§ 824o(e).
N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., COMMENTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION ON NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR
SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS, RELEASE 1.0 (DRAFT) 10 (2009),

available
http://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/us/NERC%20Filings%20to%20NIST/
FinalNERCCommentsNIST_Smart_Grid_Framework_Document.pdf.
165. Id. at 11.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Relevant section codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17385 (2012).

at
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efficient, reliable electricity network.” Interoperability concerns the
communication paths that exist between actors169 along which they
connect to “transmit, store, edit, and process the information needed
within the Smart Grid.”170 Congress granted FERC the authority to
review “work” prepared by NIST and, upon FERC’s judgment that
such work has led to “sufficient consensus,” institute a “rulemaking
proceeding to adopt . . . standards and protocols . . . necessary to
insure smart-grid functionality and interoperability in interstate
transmission of electric power, and regional and wholesale electricity
markets.”171 However, Congress did not define “work,” “sufficient
consensus,” or “adopt.” Also notably missing from the legislation
was an enforceability provision.
In November 2009, NIST established the Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel (SGIP) to coordinate the development of nonmandatory interoperability standards.172 SGIP’s members represent
twenty-two Smart Grid stakeholder categories and “[a]ll seven
integrated domains of the power system—customers, markets, service
providers, operations, bulk generation, transmission, and
distribution.”173

169. “Actors” are devices, computer systems, software programs, the individuals,
or organizations that participate in the Smart Grid. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1,
supra note 38, at 11.
170. Id. at 15.
171. § 17385(d).
172. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2013). For an interoperability standard to be
approved and, thus, added to the “SGIP Catalog of Standards,” there must be a
“Governing Board recommendation and a vote by the SGIP members, with both
votes requiring 75% in favor of approval.” Id. at 39–40. In the end, while the Catalog
of Standards is a “toolkit” for Smart Grid stakeholders, the approved standards are in
no way mandatory. Id. at 42.
173. See About Us, SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, http://www.sgip.org/
about_us/#sthash.GsJwOWVO.dpbs (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). The SGIP in turn
established a permanent working group known as the Cybersecurity Working Group
(CSWG), which has compiled some of the most substantial reports on Smart Grid
cybersecurity, including three volumes of the “Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber
Security,” referenced herein, and has the primary objective of “assess[ing] standards
for applicability and interoperability across the domains of the Smart Grid.” See
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST
FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS 2.0,
at 142 (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST_Framework_
Release_2-0_corr.pdf. In April 2013, SGIP fully transitioned into a “non-profit
private-public partnership organization . . . supported by industry stakeholder
funding and funding provided through a cooperative agreement with NIST.” Smart
Grid Interoperability Panel, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist.gov/
smartgrid/sgipbuffer.cfm (last visited Dec. 7, 2013). Prospective “participating” or
“observing” members must now pay fees to join the new “SGIP 2.0, Inc.”
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NIST standards may only gain regulatory significance if they
become part of a rulemaking proceeding by FERC under 42 U.S.C. §
17385(d).174 Notably, though, EISA does not provide express
authority to enforce interoperability standards created under the
statute to either NIST or FERC, unlike the clear grant of
enforcement authority for reliability standards under the EPAct.175
FERC’s position is that EISA did not grant it the authority to make
or enforce mandatory interoperability standards.176 As a result, to
promulgate enforceable mandatory interoperability standards under
the current EISA regime, FERC would have to reinterpret its own
authority. Standards set forth after such a change in policy present an
issue because they may be invalidated as “arbitrary and capricious”
under the Administrative Procedure Act.177
FERC has interpreted its own authority under EISA as including
adoption of standards that would “be applicable to all electric power
facilities and devices with smart grid features, including those at the

local distribution level and those used directly by retail customers so
long as the standard is necessary for the purpose [of 16 U.S.C. §
824o].”178 This interpretation represents a jurisdictional reach greater

Membership,

SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, http://www.sgip.org/
membership/#sthash.BRsKbeG2.dpbs (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
174. § 17385(d).
175. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e) (2012) (detailing ERO authority in enforcing
mandated reliability standards); Eisen, supra note 172, at 37 (“Critically, the EISA
did not give FERC any new powers to enforce any standards it might adopt, beyond
its existing FPA authorities to regulate interstate transmission of electricity. Its role
is limited to ensuring the standards’ functionality.”).
176. Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,098, 37,101 (July 27, 2009).
177. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). A reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. The
Supreme Court has held that in order for a changed policy to survive “arbitrary and
capricious” review, it suffices that (1) the new policy is permissible under the statute,
(2) there are good reasons for it, and (3) the agency believes it to be better. See FCC
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). However, a court may
conduct a more searching review of the justifications for the change in policy if, for
example, the new policy rests on facts that contradict those which underlay its prior
policy, or if the prior policy engendered serious reliance interests. Id. at 516. In such
a rapidly growing industry, there may be powerful reliance interests founded on
FERC’s prior policy; for example, significant investments made by businesses with
the understanding that FERC would not mandate enforceable communication
security standards may prove financially detrimental should their systems be found
noncompliant with new enforceable standards and in need of substantial retooling.
Those reliance interests arguably become stronger as time progresses.
178. Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,098 (emphasis added).
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than the one in the reliability sphere.179 FERC’s position met with
significant opposition from members of the electricity industry and
PUCs.180 Industry members asserted that technical standards are
typically developed and adopted by the private sector on a voluntary
basis, while PUCs claimed that they retained jurisdiction over
distribution-level projects.181 One argument set forth by utilities and
PUCs in protecting their activities from mandated technical
requirements was that “mandated standards preserve technologies in
amber, making them potentially obsolete later.”182
These statutory ambiguities and jurisdictional conflicts have led to
a stalemate: to date, FERC has not mandated any technical
interoperability standards. NIST only made one attempt to submit
standards to FERC for consideration in a potential rulemaking
proceeding. On October 6, 2010, NIST notified FERC that it had
“identified five families of standards as ready for consideration by
regulators.”183 Ultimately, FERC issued an order on July 19, 2011
finding that there was “insufficient consensus” to institute a
rulemaking proceeding on the five families of standards.184 Since
then, no other standards have been submitted to FERC by NIST.
However, NIST has continued to develop voluntary standards and
prepare comprehensive reports analyzing, in great detail, the many
communication interfaces existing within the Smart Grid and offering
suggestions on how to enhance their security. In fact, fifty-six
voluntary standards have been approved through the SGIP process,185
and subsequently added to SGIP’s Catalog of Standards.186
The security deficiencies that can arise from reliance upon
voluntary standards were illuminated in a report developed by
Congressmen Edward J. Markey and Henry A. Waxman, thenChairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment

179. Regulatory jurisdiction in the reliability sphere reaches the “bulk-power
system,” which includes generational and transmission facilities, but excludes
facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy. See supra notes 152–56 and
accompanying text.
180. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 51.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. FERC Order on Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, 136 F.E.R.C. 61,039,
Slip Op. at 3 (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/
20110719143912-RM11-2-000.pdf.
184. Id. at i. For a deeper discussion of FERC’s order, see infra Part V.A.1.
185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text for a description of the process.
186. SGIP Catalog of Standards Information Library, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS &
TECH.,
http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/SGIPCoS
StandardsInformationLibrary (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
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and then-Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
respectively. The report identifies both mandatory and voluntary
NERC standards187 and polled utilities about their compliance with
each.188 The Senators found that most utilities only comply with
mandatory cybersecurity standards, without implementing voluntary
NERC recommendations.189
The utilities’ failure to implement adequate cybersecurity
standards is also demonstrated in another report prepared by the
DOE’s Inspector General, which showed that while ninety-nine
grants were awarded by the DOE under its “Smart Grid Investment
Grant” (SGIG) program totaling $7.8 billion,190 thirty-six percent of
grant applications “were missing at least one of the required cyber
security elements.”191 The report concluded that the approved
cybersecurity plans did not adequately address security risks or
planned cybersecurity controls.192
EISA’s lack of an enforcement provision in conjunction with
FERC’s disclaimer of authority to promulgate mandatory enforceable
interoperability standards has resulted in a voluntary adoption
regime.193 Congressmen Markey and Waxman’s report demonstrated
that utilities implemented voluntary standards less often than
mandatory ones. The DOE Inspector General’s report showed
inadequate cybersecurity planning by recipients of SGIG grants.
These facts reveal some of the potential flaws of a voluntary regime.

187. It is worth noting that these standards were aimed at reducing vulnerabilities
identified by analysis of the Stuxnet and Aurora occurrences, discussed supra Part
II.A.
188. See MARKEY REPORT, supra note 87, at 12.
189. Id. For example, 91% of investor-owned utilities, 83% of municipally- or
cooperatively-owned utilities, and 80% of federal entities that own major pieces of
the bulk-power system reported compliance with the mandatory Stuxnet standards,
while 21% of investor-owned utilities, 44% of municipally- or cooperatively-owned
utilities, and 62.5% of federal entities reported compliance with the voluntary
Stuxnet standards.
190. See Paladino, supra note 51.
191. See U.S. Smart Grid Projects Failing on Security, INFORMATION AGE (Jan.
27), 2012, http://www.information-age.com/technology/information-management/
1687918/us-smart-grid-projects-failing-on-security.
192. Id.
193. Pursuant to a performance audit of electrical grid cybersecurity, the United
States Government Accountability Office concluded that FERC’s lack of
enforcement authority rendered standards developed by NIST under EISA
voluntary. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRICITY GRID
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT
KEY CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED 18 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11117.pdf.
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C. Subsequent Legislative and Executive Efforts to Address
Electric Grid Cybersecurity, and the Likelihood of Successful
Future Legislation
Since their passage, it has become apparent that neither EPAct nor
EISA grant federal agencies the authority necessary to protect the
electrical grid from cyber threats. High-level FERC officials have
cited cybersecurity as the top threat to the nation’s electric grid and
encouraged—and at times implored—Congress to provide a federal
body with sufficient enforcement authority to secure the grid.194
Legislation aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in
different ways has been proposed, with some bills coming closer to
enactment than others.
The electrical grid cybersecurity bill that came closest to enactment
was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 14, 2010 as
H.R. 5026, also known as the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure
Defense Act (GRID Act).195 The GRID Act would have granted
FERC the authority to issue emergency orders to protect the grid
against a security threat brought to its attention by the President.
FERC would have also been authorized to promulgate a rule or issue
an order, independent of NERC, requiring owners and operators in
the bulk-power system196 to implement measures to protect against
any grid security vulnerability that had not been adequately
addressed by NERC-developed reliability standards. The bill was

194. In 2011, all five FERC commissioners indicated at a House of Representatives
hearing that they considered a cyber attack on the electrical grid as the top threat to
electric reliability, and several emphasized the need for additional enforcement
authority. See The American Energy Initiative, Part 12: Impacts of the

Environmental Protection Agency’s New and Proposed Power Sector Regulations on
Electric Reliability: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H.
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 251–52 (2011). In 2012, FERC
Chairman Jon Wellinghoff implored Congress to empower a federal body with the
powers necessary to protect the grid from cyber threats. Chairman Wellinghoff
stated that FERC had (1) no effective way to confidentially communicate cyber
threats to utilities, and (2) no effective enforcement authority, adding, “I don’t care
who has the authority, just give it to somebody so we can do something. The
Congress should give someone the authority.” Darius Dixon, FERC Chief Says
Power Grid Lacks Cybersecurity Mandate, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.
& GOVERNMENTAL AFF. (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/fercchairman-says-electric-grid-natural-gas-lines-are-vulnerable-to-cyber-attack-.
195. See S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RES., 111TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE
CALENDAR ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 2009–2010, at 81–82 (2010).
196. The GRID Act retained the definition of the bulk-power system from section
215 of the FPA, which excluded distribution level facilities. See H.R. 5026, 111th
Cong. § 215A(a)(1) (2010) (adopting the definition of the bulk-power system given in
§ 215(a) of the Federal Power Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(1) (2012)).
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reported to the house by a 47–0 vote of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce on May 25, 2010.
The House of
Representatives passed H.R. 5026 on June 9, 2010. It was then
referred to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on
June 10, 2010, where it was ultimately reported out to the Senate with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute bill197 and placed on the
Senate Legislative Calendar on September 27, 2010. The bill never
made it to the Senate floor.
Regarding H.R. 5026’s failure in the Senate, Congressman Edward
Markey, a co-sponsor of the original House version of the bill,
believed that the “electric utility industry . . . successfully persuaded
Senate Republicans to stall the bill” and had “lobbied aggressively
against the measure. House Republicans have acceded to industry’s
desire to simply regulate itself.”198 At a House hearing in 2011, two
congressmen indicated that the difficulty in the Senate was not
whether additional legislation addressing the grid’s cybersecurity
shortcomings should be passed, but how those shortcomings should
be addressed.199 Other legislative efforts of varying success over the

197. Notably, the substitute bill would have expanded FERC’s jurisdiction beyond
the bulk-power system to include “systems and assets . . . used for . . . distribution of
electric energy affecting interstate commerce . . . .” S. REP. NO. 111-331, at 1 (2010).
Similar to H.R. 5026, it would have authorized FERC to issue its own rules or orders
without prior notice or hearing to protect the grid from cybersecurity vulnerability.
However, the substitute removed aspects of H.R. 5026 that addressed threats to the
grid by electromagnetic pulses and solar flares. See id.; see also Ken Timmerman,
Murkowski Blocks Effort to Protect US Power Grid, NEWSMAX (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.newsmax.com/KenTimmerman/lisa-murkowski-emp-energy/2010/10/14/
id/373768.
198. Letter from Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative of Mass., to Barack
Obama, President of the United States (Aug. 8, 2012), available at
http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/sites/democrats.naturalresources.house.
gov/files/documents/2012-08-08_GridSecurity_POTUS.pdf. Utility industry reticence
may be, at least in part, attributable to the industry’s belief that it is already subjected
to ample mandatory cybersecurity regulations. The American Public Power
Association noted that “[u]nlike other industry sectors, the electric utility industry
must comply with an extensive list of mandatory reliability standards, including
cybersecurity standards.” AM. PUB. POWER ASSOC., STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION ON 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 2003 NORTHEAST
BLACKOUT (2013), available at http://www.publicpower.org (follow “Resources”
hyperlink; then follow “Archived press releases” hyperlink; then follow “8/15/2013”
hyperlink).
199. Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona stated that the “big challenge was that
[Senators] had differing strategies on what should be done about cybersecurity.”

Protecting the Electric Grid: H.R. ___, the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure
Defense Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H.
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 49 (2011) (statement of Trent
Franks, U.S. Rep. of Ariz.). Congressman James R. Langevin added, “[W]e were a
bit frustrated by the Senate still contemplating which path forward they were going to
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past five years have shown that while Congress is cognizant of the
importance of filling regulatory gaps to ensure Smart Grid
cybersecurity, it has had difficulty finding the right mix of provisions
that would allow legislation to pass both Houses.200
In the absence of new legislation, President Obama issued an
executive order on February 12, 2013 entitled “Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”201 The order emphasized collaboration
between the United States government and critical infrastructure
owners and operators.202 It also reinforced the importance of NIST’s
role in developing a “Cybersecurity Framework” to reduce cyber
risks to critical infrastructure, incorporating voluntary consensus
standards and industry best practices.203 The Secretary of Homeland
Security was ordered to establish a “voluntary program to support the
adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework by owners and operators of
critical infrastructure,” as well as incentives designed to promote
participation in the program.204 The President’s order therefore
sustained the voluntary interoperability standard adoption
environment that has persisted following the passage of EPAct and
EISA, with an eventual aim of incentivizing adoption.

take,” with the key to achieving Senate cooperation being “perseverance.” Id. at 49–
50 (statement of James R. Langevin, U.S. Rep. of R.I.).
200. H.R. 668, also known as the Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity
from Lethal Damage Act, or “SHIELD Act,” focused on the protection of the grid
from damage by geomagnetic storms or electromagnetic pulses, which was one area
of focus in the GRID Act as well; however, it does not address the other important
component of the GRID Act—electronic communication-based cyber threats. See
H.R. 668, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill was not reported out of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce in 2011, but was reintroduced as H.R. 2417 on June 18, 2013
and referred to the same committee. See H.R. 668 (112th): Secure High-voltage
Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr668 (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). S. 1342,
also known as the Grid Cyber Security Act, would have expanded FERC’s
jurisdiction in instituting reliability standards to include distribution-level facilities
and authorized FERC to direct NERC to develop and implement mandatory
cybersecurity standards, rather than having to wait for NERC to bring it standards
for approval. See S. 1342, 112th Cong. §§ 215(d)(7), 224(a)(1) (2011). This was a
retreat from the GRID Act, which sought to authorize FERC to promulgate
cybersecurity rules or standards independent of NERC under certain circumstances.
See H.R. 5026, 111th Cong. § 215A(b)–(c) (2010). The bill was reported out of the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, but saw no further
congressional action. See S. 1342 Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01342:@@@X (last visited Apr. 13,
2014).
201. Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
202. See id.
203. See id. at 11,740–41.
204. See id. at 11,741–42.
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While developing an effective incentive-based voluntary
environment sounds attractive in some ways, it is important to note
that it may take significant time to identify appropriate incentives and
then perfect the incentive program through periods of trial-and-error.
Given the rapid pace at which the Smart Grid is developing205 and the
time that has elapsed thus far without FERC adopting
interoperability standards under EISA,206 this planning and
implementation window may render the grid vulnerable in the
meantime with information technology ultimately becoming so
entrenched that achieving retroactive compliance would be extremely
costly and time-consuming. Through a performance audit, the
Government Accountability Office found that while some grid
stakeholders believed that “economic and market pressure should
encourage manufacturers and utilities to follow voluntary standards,”
others felt there could be gaps in compliance where there are
significant cost considerations, or simply unfamiliarity or disinterest in
implementation.207
In assessing whether Smart Grid interoperability standards should
remain free from government mandates and left to the electricity
industry members to develop, implement, and possibly enforce,
consideration of an existing industry-created and policed standard
regime, such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
(PCI-DSS), can provide insight as to how fitting such a regime might
be for the future of the Smart Grid.
IV. THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE FROM VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS: PCI-DSS AS AN INDUSTRY-DEVELOPED STANDARD
ANALOGUE
Some have suggested that voluntary industry-developed
interoperability standards would allow for the effective market-driven
evolution of the Smart Grid industry, similar to the growth of the
Internet208 which, in the 1990s, Congress found presented a “forum for
a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity”

205. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
206. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
207. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 193.
208. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 55–56. The utility industry has lobbied against
additional federal authority to mandate cybersecurity standards, seeking instead to
regulate itself. See Letter from Edward J. Markey, supra note 198.
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that flourished with a minimum of government regulation.209 The
payment card industry is another example of a sector that has, to a
large extent, regulated itself through an industry-developed standard:
PCI-DSS. This standard does have enforcement elements, but is
voluntary in the sense that it is enforced through private agreements
rather than government mandates.210 While PCI-DSS has not been a
complete failure, it has had its share of cybersecurity challenges.211
PCI-DSS shows that even where there are creative industrydeveloped standards and enforcement procedures, substantial
breaches will still occur. The risk of noncompliance is even greater
where, as in the Smart Grid, the voluntary standard regime lacks
private enforcement procedures.
PCI-DSS is a security standard in the United States that applies to
the payment card industry. The standard is established by a
consortium of the major credit card companies in the United States212
and requires that merchants accepting credit card payments
implement the standard, which is designed to provide an “actionable
framework for developing a robust payment card data security
process—including prevention, detection and appropriate reaction to
security incidents.”213
Although the standard is developed
cooperatively, each card brand has its own requirements that
merchants accepting that brand must meet.214 It is an industrydeveloped and industry-enforced standard aimed at protecting
cardholder data215 and represents a form of “private ordering” by
which behavior and resolution of disputes are regulated by non-

209. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
congressional findings codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012) pursuant to the
passage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996).
210. See Edward A. Morse & Vasant Raval, Private Ordering in Light of the Law:
Achieving Consumer Protection Through Payment Card Security Measures, 10
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 213, 231 (2012).
211. See infra notes 218–24 and accompanying text.
212. The credit card consortium includes American Express, Discover Financial
Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa, Inc. What Is the PCI
Security
Standards
Council?,
PCI
SECURITY
STANDARDS
COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/role_of_pci_council.php (last
visited Apr. 13, 2014).
213. PCI SCC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS
COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php (last
visited Apr. 13, 2014).
214. The payment card brands place merchants in various tier systems based on
volume of transactions, with merchants conducting more transactions being subjected
to more stringent security requirements. See Morse & Raval, supra note 210, at 235–
37.
215. See VERIZON, supra note 104, at 56.
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governmental entities.216 The standards are rooted in the economic
benefits the payment card industry realizes from easing consumer
fears regarding unauthorized charges that may otherwise discourage
them from using payment cards.217
One report analyzed breaches of organizations required to comply
with PCI-DSS.218 It highlighted the problem of the “comparative
mindset” in implementing an information technology security
strategy: organizations rationalize that “being just slightly better than
others also somehow equates to being secure.”219 Where there is total
freedom, i.e., in the absence of mandatory standards, the comparative
mindset may result in organizations settling for especially low levels
of security.
The report identified three comparative mindset categories: good,
better, and best.220 A “good” security mindset is “my security is better
than [that of] many of my peers, but we’re still not meeting our
compliance requirements;” a “better” mindset is “my security is
better than [that of] most of my peers and also meets the letter of our
compliance requirements;” the “best” mindset is “my security is
better than [that of] most of my peers, meets the spirit of our
compliance requirements, and evolves with the changing threat
landscape.”221
The report found that ninety-six percent of
organizations subject to PCI-DSS that had been breached were noncompliant, failing to display the “better” or “best” mindsets. The
majority of breach victims did not even make the “good” security
category.222 This shows that even in a system governed by an
“extralegal mechanism with an elaborate set of processes, structures,
and information,”223 and fine structures aimed at incentivizing security
investment, non-compliance is still a significant issue.224 In the Smart
Grid, the lack of enforceable penalties only amplifies these noncompliance concerns.

216. Morse & Raval, supra note 213, at 214.
217. See id. at 223–24 (noting that payment card firms offer consumers more
protection than is mandated under federal law, with “[s]elf-interest produc[ing] this
result: if consumer fears regarding unauthorized charges induce them not to use their
cards, the payment card industry makes no profits”).
218. See VERIZON, supra note 104, at 56–60.
219. See id. at 56.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Morse & Ravel, supra note 210, at 237.
224. See VERIZON, supra note 104, at 2.
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Private ordering without significant government intervention may
be appropriate in some circumstances. Maybe there is a gap in
technical expertise between private businesses and public regulators
that would render public efforts to intervene critically uninformed
and ineffective. As in the case of PCI-DSS, it might be that industry
standards imposed through contracts can be sufficiently driven by
economic incentives.225 Perhaps there is a greater overarching
governmental interest that justifies a more “hands-off” approach,
such as nurturing a burgeoning forum for discourse and cultural
development like the Internet.226
In the Smart Grid context, however, NIST has established itself as
an agency with significant expertise.227 Additionally, it is unclear
whether Smart Grid industry participants will realize the same type of
economic benefits of security so that they will privately order
themselves, through contractual arrangements, in a manner that will
allow for the type of industry-enforced standards present in PCI-DSS.
Congress has expressed that it is United States policy to modernize
the electrical grid to “maintain a reliable and secure electricity
infrastructure,” through, in part, the “[d]ynamic optimization of grid
operations and resources, with full cyber-security.”228 Whereas
freedom of speech and expression were primary concerns in
regulating the Internet, ensuring full critical infrastructure
cybersecurity—and thus national security—should be a primary
concern in the Smart Grid.
V. SHAPING A SOLUTION
Private ordering is not a strong option for the Smart Grid because
there is a weak “expertise gap” argument, uncertain economic
incentives for implementing interoperability security, and a
congressional commitment to obtaining full Smart Grid cybersecurity.
Part V.A demonstrates that the inadequacy of the current system, the
high stakes involved, and the expertise and experience of NIST
render federal mandatory enforceable standards governing the
communication of information in the Smart Grid the most
appropriate response to ensure Smart Grid cybersecurity. Part V.B
explains why NIST is the appropriate entity to be given the authority

225.
226.
227.
228.

See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
See infra Part V.B.2.
42 U.S.C. § 17381(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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to do so, while describing what a legislative solution in this spirit
might look like.
A. Mandatory Federal Standards Governing Smart Grid
Information Systems Are Necessary
It can be argued that a blossoming industry centered on new
technologies (e.g., the Internet) may, in some circumstances and in
light of certain goals, be better served by an unregulated
environment.229 Nevertheless, given that the developing Smart Grid
industry is grounded in and developing upon the generation,
transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity, important
interests are raised that render mandatory regulations more
appropriate.230 This subpart will explore three justifications for
mandatory federal regulation of Smart Grid information systems: (1)
the inadequacy of the current system, (2) the high stakes involved,
and (3) the benefits to all stakeholders of a uniform standard
approach.

1.

The Current System for Development of Interoperability
Standards Is Inadequate

Currently under EISA, FERC is instructed to institute a
rulemaking proceeding to adopt interoperability standards developed
by NIST once FERC has determined that such standards have
reached “sufficient consensus.”231
This process has only been explored once when NIST submitted a
letter to FERC on October 6, 2010, indicating that it had “identified
five foundational families of standards as ready for consideration by
regulators.”232 On July 19, 2011—more than nine months later—
FERC issued an order refusing to initiate a rulemaking proceeding in

229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. Professor Joel B. Eisen has
suggested that allowing the Smart Grid to evolve in a manner similar to the Internet
would “yield better results than trying to dictate mandatory standards today.” See
Eisen, supra note 172, at 56.
230. Cf. NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 76 (“Power system operations
pose many security challenges that are different from most other industries. For
example, the Internet is different from the power system operations environment. In
particular, there are strict performance and reliability requirements that are needed
by power system operations.”).
231. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
232. Letter from George Arnold, Nat’l Coordinator, Smart Grid Interoperability,
to Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Oct. 6, 2010),
available at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/FERC-letter-10-62010.pdf.
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connection with these five families of standards.233 Ironically, FERC
cited concerns that the proposed cybersecurity standards may lead to
cybersecurity deficiencies.234 FERC explained that while, at the time
of the order, the “NIST interoperability framework process” was the
“best vehicle for developing smart grid interoperability standards,”
certain aspects of that process were not in place at the time the
proposed standards were being developed,235 which contributed to the
finding of insufficient consensus. The order concluded by giving
NIST and SGIP supportive praise, encouraging “utilities, smart grid
product manufacturers, regulators, and other smart grid stakeholders
to actively participate in the NIST interoperability framework
process.”236
SGIP responded to FERC’s decision by stating that it
“appreciate[d]” FERC’s acknowledgment of SGIP’s value,237 and
George Arnold, the Smart Grid National Coordinator for NIST,
stated that NIST supported FERC’s order.238 Despite NIST and
SGIP’s continuing development of impressive work product aimed at
encouraging Smart Grid cybersecurity, the EISA rulemaking
procedure has not been pursued again since it failed in July 2011.
Thus, in the almost six years since EISA created this interagency
coordination procedure, FERC has not promulgated any
interoperability standards or protocols, despite projections that Smart
Meters will be installed in over half the nation’s homes by 2015.239
Even if rules had been established, it is unclear from the language
of EISA what enforcement tools FERC would have had at its disposal
to enforce them. FERC has reinforced the enforcement predicament
by issuing a notice indicating that it did not interpret EISA as
233. See FERC Order on Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, supra note 183.
234. FERC explained that the standards were not adopted in part because
“[c]ommenters were nearly unanimous” in their opposition to the standards, “citing
concerns with cyber security deficiencies and potential unintended consequences
from premature adoption of individual standards.” Id. at 5.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 7.
237. See FERC Will Not Adopt Five NIST-Recommended Smart Grid Standards,
ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER (July 27, 2011), http://www.elp.com/articles/2011/07/fercwill-not-adopt-five-nist-recommended-smart-grid-standards-.html.
238. Mr. Arnold stated that the order was “consistent with NIST’s public
comments to the commission that it can send appropriate signals to the marketplace
by recommending use of the NIST framework and that it would be impractical and
unnecessary for the commission to adopt individual interoperability standards.”
Michael Bates, FERC Decision Leaves Grid Interoperability Standards in Limbo,
RENEW GRID (July 21, 2011), http://www.renewgridmag.com/e107_plugins/content/
content.php?content.7062.
239. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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granting it the authority to promulgate enforceable mandatory
standards, meaning that, under the existing regime, FERC would
have to first reinterpret its own authority, which could prove
challenging.240
Given that SGIP requires a seventy-five percent approval rate
before adding an interoperability standard to its Catalog of
Standards,241 to also require a finding of undefined “sufficient
consensus” by FERC after SGIP has blessed the standard by such a
significant supermajority of diverse Smart Grid stakeholders242 can
take a long time, is redundant, and is ultimately a very high barrier to
the promulgation of interoperability standards.
The push for adoption of voluntary standards often relies upon the
“hortatory ability” of government agencies such as NIST, DOE, and
FERC in convincing stakeholders and PUCs that standards should be
followed.243
Without mandatory enforceable requirements, the
decision might simply come down to whether cybersecurity is a
“reasonable and prudent” investment.244 Although the development
of mandatory reliability standards by NERC and FERC under the
EPAct are necessary to ensure that the critical assets of the Smart
Grid are secured, the communications between these components
must be secured as well.245 This goal should be accomplished through
similarly mandatory and enforceable interoperability standards. The
failure to promulgate any interoperability standards since the
inception of EISA in 2007, the absence of an express statutory grant
of enforcement mechanisms, and the redundancy of a doubleconsensus system involving undefined requirements (e.g., “sufficient
consensus”) indicate an unacceptable level of inactivity in a
burgeoning industry,246 given the high stakes.

240. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
242. For a description of SGIP participants, see supra note 173 and accompanying
text.
243. See Ray Gifford & Eric Gunning, The Opportunity and Peril of Smart Grid,
11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 128, 129 (2010).
244. Id. at 130.
245. While NERC and FERC reliability standards may aid in securing the
components that make up the Smart Grid, “[t]he strongest adversaries are not going
to waste time attacking a component device that is known to be a fortress.” Instead,
attackers will look to find weaknesses between the secure components as they speak
to each other and communicate information. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at
6–7.
246. The Institute for Electric Efficiency found that while Smart Meters were
installed in approximately one-in-four homes as of September 2011, their presence in
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2. The High Stakes Nature of an Industry Based on the Nation’s
Electric Grid Warrants Mandatory Enforceable Federal Standards
Time is of the essence. The deployment of technology in
distribution-level equipment, generation facilities, utilities, and ESPs
in the absence of interoperability standards will result in security that
is only as strong as individual companies choose to make it. Even if a
company chooses to make cybersecurity a top priority, information
may become vulnerable at some point as it travels through
communication pathways between other less-secure entities, given the
lack of a uniform standard by which all parties participating in that
type of communication must abide. Those vulnerabilities only
proliferate as more equipment and technology is deployed in the
absence of mandatory standards.
Electricity is ingrained in our daily lives.247 The Department of
Energy has stated that there is “the potential for extreme damage
from a cyber attack”248 on the electric grid that could cause “extended
power outages and destruction of electrical equipment.”249 It added
that a cyber attack could be “launched through the public network
from a remote location anywhere in the world and could be
coordinated to attack many locations simultaneously,” and “[a]ny
prolonged or widespread disruption of energy supplies could produce
devastating human and economic consequences.”250 Consistent with
the fact that we are dependent on electricity in virtually all aspects of
our lives, a 2012 report prepared by industry experts assembled by the
National Research Council stated that it is “no stretch of the
imagination” to think that a “systematically designed and executed
terrorist attack” could entail costs of hundreds of billions of dollars.251

over half of the nation’s households is expected by 2015. See INST. FOR ELEC.
EFFICIENCY, supra note 44.
247. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 5 (noting
that “[m]odern society has come to depend on reliable electricity as an essential
resource for national security; health and welfare; communications; finance;
transportation; food and water supply; heating, cooling, and lighting; computers and
electronics; commercial enterprise; and even entertainment and leisure”).
248. See OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 53, at 3.
249. Id. at 1.
250. Id.
251. COMM. ON ENHANCING THE ROBUSTNESS & RESILIENCE OF FUTURE ELEC.
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. TO TERRORIST ATTACK ET AL.,
TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2012), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12050.
By way of comparison, the
August 14, 2003 Northeast blackout, which affected approximately 50 million people
and lasted up to four days in some areas, cost the United States between $4 billion
and $10 billion. See U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 1.
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One economist who produces security-related data for the
government estimated that if one-third of the country lost power for
three months it would cost the economy $700 billion, equivalent to
“40 to 50 large hurricanes striking all at once . . . . [and] greater
economic damage than any modern economy ever suffered.”252
Two scholars highlighted the terror that might ensue in cities
following targeted cyber attacks. They described the hypothetical
scene in New York City following an anonymous attack aimed at
disrupting the subway system, stranding subway cars in tunnels at 8:00
a.m. on a Thursday morning.253 All systems that rely on electricity
could be susceptible to Internet-based attacks on an enormous scale
given the interconnected nature of the electrical grid. Adding to
these significant communal and national security concerns are the
substantial personal privacy concerns previously discussed.254
Given the inextricable integration of electricity in our daily lives,
the rapidity with which the Smart Grid is developing, the national
security and personal privacy and safety threats that infiltration of the
Smart Grid through the Internet poses, and the enormity of the
potential economic consequences, it is clear that too much is at stake
to let Smart Grid stakeholders privately order themselves in the way
that Internet stakeholders were permitted to. The integrity of the
system must be the top priority where, as here, the threats are real,
attacks have been committed, and many parties have an interest in
capitalizing on vulnerabilities in the system.255 This is a situation that
calls for uniform mandated enforceable security requirements.

3.

A Uniform Federal Approach to Cybersecurity Would Benefit
All Smart Grid Stakeholders

State governments retained substantial regulatory control over
utilities in the Traditional Grid.256 Accordingly, state PUCs continue
to assert their jurisdictional claim to distribution-level activities,

252. Meserve, supra note 81 (quoting economist Scott Borg).
253. See Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism:
An Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 1417. For another example of the frightening ripple effect “layered” cyber attacks
might have, see id. at 23–24.
254. See supra Part II.C.
255. See supra Part II.A–B.
256. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the compact between states and utilities
through which states gained regulatory authority over utilities in the Traditional
Grid).
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rebuffing the idea of federal regulation.257 The resulting patchwork of
state standards can lead to detrimental inconsistencies in an industry
that has become interstate in nature.258 As one such interstate
industry, the Smart Grid would be better served by uniform federal
standards.
First, a uniform set of mandatory interoperability standards would
assist businesses by providing a set of rules to which innovations can
be tailored. This solution would allow technologies to take root and
develop reputations and track records. Utilities would likely be more
comfortable adopting established technologies that have a lower
likelihood of becoming obsolete or growing out of favor tomorrow.259
Currently, Smart Grid businesses have likely been impacted in their
decision-making by the uncertainty regarding interoperability
standards. As one research report noted, “Those who choose to plow
ahead now risk losing their entire investment if future laws invalidate
their approach.”260 As the industry expands, more and more decisions
are predicated on guesswork. The time to institute mandatory
standards is now, rather than five years from now after there has been
a cyber attack or new laws require the costly replacement of

257. See, e.g., Bruce W. Radford, The Smart-Enough Grid, PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY (Aug. 2009), http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2009/08/smartenough-grid (citing the California PUC as insisting that the states, rather than FERC,
should have the authority to direct electric companies whether to institute NISTdeveloped standards at the distribution level); see also supra notes 180–82 and
accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Morse & Raval, supra note 210, at 244 (highlighting the issues
presented by a patchwork of state standards in the payment card industry by noting
that “[v]ariation in requirements among the states potentially creates significant
problems for firms engaged in multijurisdictional business operations, which might be
solved by uniform requirements within a federal statute”). One scholar has noted
that state-by-state Smart Grid solutions raise a number of issues, including
unpredictable results and confusing implications for utilities that purvey electricity in
more than one state. See Balough, supra note 124, at 183, 188–89. Even some PUCs,
despite their opposition to a perceived federal usurpation of traditional state powers,
have recognized that a “patchwork” of state standards could be harmful, see
Radford, supra note 257 (citing statements by the California PUC), and that
cybersecurity may be a special area over which federal regulatory authority is be
appropriate, see Eisen, supra note 172, at 55 n.344 (noting that Michigan Public
Service Commission opposed enforceable federal interoperability standards, except
in limited areas, such as cybersecurity).
259. Given the nature of utilities as natural monopolies and the resulting
regulatory environment, utilities seek to earn a negotiated return on prudent capital
investments. Minimizing risk is a top priority, and “utilities are often slow to adopt
new technologies that have not been extensively proven outside a laboratory.” See
Quinn & Reed, supra note 33, at 873.
260. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 5.
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entrenched systems deemed non-compliant. These concerns only
become more considerable with the passage of time.
Next, and most importantly, uniform mandatory standards would
reduce the system vulnerabilities that result from voluntary standards
where businesses have the option to invest a lot, a little, or nothing at
all in cybersecurity.261 If a critical piece of information flows through
Companies 1, 2, and 3, with Companies 1 and 3 employing strong
security measures and Company 2 employing weak security measures,
the weakest link causes that information to become vulnerable to
interception despite the efforts of Companies 1 and 3.262 Uniform
standards would help to ensure that information travels with a
consistent level of protection throughout the Smart Grid,263 protecting
business operations from harmful intrusion and consumers from
unwanted exposure of private information.
Finally, federal mandatory standards applicable to all Smart Grid
stakeholders would provide certainty to an industry in which key
players are risk-averse (i.e., electric utilities) by providing a firm
footing upon which technologies can be built with a focused aim
towards compliance. Creating uniform standards throughout the
system would help to ensure fairness and reduce the likelihood that
malicious parties would intercept information or access critical
systems by exploiting a weak point in the network.
B. NIST Should Be Given Statutory Responsibility and
Authority to Establish Mandatory Federal Standards that Apply
to All Smart Grid Participants
A legislative solution reconfiguring and redefining responsibilities
in a manner that removes FERC from the process and grants NIST

261. See generally supra Parts III.B, IV.
262. See, e.g., PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 6–7 (noting that “[s]ecurity is only
as strong as its weakest link and the best attackers know instinctively to look for that
weak link,” “[t]he best encryption algorithm in the world is useless if key distribution
is not adequately secured,” and “sophisticated attackers will look for holes in
between secure components—things that architecture would address”).
263. In explaining the rationale behind establishing a uniform approach to securing
information in the federal system under its Federal Information Security
Management Act powers, NIST stated that “[a] common foundation for information
security will provide the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence sectors of the federal
government and their support contractors, more cost-effective and consistent ways to
manage information security-related risk to organizational operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-53, SECURITY AND
PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS, at
vii (2013).

1398

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

the authority to institute mandatory enforceable interoperability
standards for all Smart Grid participants would require two essential
determinations: (1) that federal regulatory jurisdiction in this manner
is constitutional, and (2) that NIST is the appropriate federal entity to
promulgate these standards. Several substantive and logistical
considerations are also important to such a solution, including
enforcement
authority,
industry
involvement,
compliance
certification, and the ability of the standards to evolve over time.

1.

Federal Jurisdiction Over All Smart Grid Participants is
Appropriate

Although much of the regulation in the Traditional Grid was
performed by state PUCs as part of the natural monopoly “compact”
with utility companies,264 the expansion of interstate transmission of
electricity has substantially increased the reach of federal regulatory
jurisdiction.265 The Supreme Court has held that “any electricity that
enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy
that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.”266 This modern
understanding of the physical properties of electricity flowing in an
interstate electrical grid counters the outdated perception that
electricity provision is a localized operation best regulated by
individual states.267 Rather, it suggests that broader federal regulatory
jurisdiction may be appropriate.
State PUCs have opposed FERC interpreting its authority under
EISA to extend to “all electric power facilities and devices with smart
grid features, including those at the local distribution level and those

264. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. The Federal Power Act
originally granted FERC jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity in interstate
commerce and interstate electric transmission, while state PUCs reserved jurisdiction
over retail electric sales, local distribution, and the siting of power plants and
transmission lines. See Wokutch, supra note 40, at 545.
265. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Electrical Engineers, Energy Economists &
Physicists in Support of Respondents in No. 00-568 at 3, New York v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (Nos. 00-568, 00-809) (explaining that while
interstate electrical networks and transmissions were rare in 1935, today, “every highvoltage transmission line in the continental U.S. (outside Texas) is wired into one of
the two vast interstate grids,” causing the electricity transmission system to grow
“away from the state regulatory territory defined by the FPA and grow[] into federal
territory”).
266. New York, 535 U.S. at 7.
267. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the compact between utilities and states that
grant states substantial regulatory control over utilities in exchange for permitting
utilities regional monopolies).
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used directly by retail customers.”268 As one scholar notes, PUCs
viewed these assertions as “throwing down the jurisdictional
gauntlet” and an “unwarranted interference” with their authority to
implement standards for distribution-level projects.269
However, cybersecurity is a trait uniquely integral to this new
Smart Grid, with little history in the Traditional Grid.270 It is a
twenty-first century concern that has national security and privacy
implications linked to new technologies. NIST found that most states
had “little or no documentation available” for review by the Cyber
Security Working Group’s Privacy Subgroup.271 Even some PUCs,
despite their general opposition to federal intervention, have
recognized that cybersecurity may be a special area over which
federal regulatory authority is appropriate.272
In light of the highly interconnected, interstate nature of the
electricity industry that has been acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in New York v. FERC, congressional legislation granting topto-bottom federal regulatory authority over the narrow area of Smart
Grid cybersecurity is likely justified under the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause.273 The Supreme Court has held that where there
is a clear interstate market that is within the federal government’s
authority to regulate and can be substantially affected by intrastate
commercial activity, the intrastate activity can be federally regulated
under the Commerce Clause.274 Smart Grid businesses are engaged in

268. Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,098, 37,101 (July 27, 2009). FERC explains
that it so interprets its jurisdiction because “Congress [did] not exclude from the
scope of EISA 1305(d) facilities used in local distribution, or otherwise limit [FERC]
authority to approve standards.” Id.
269. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 56 n.237; see also Radford, supra note 257.
270. Historically, electric meter readings were taken in person, showed lump-sum
longer-term energy usage (as opposed to appliance-specific usage in the Smart Grid),
and were not shared in ways anticipated in the Smart Grid. Therefore, energy
consumption patterns were not a matter that rose to public concern. See NIST
GUIDELINES VOL. 2, supra note 42, at 9.
271. See id.
272. See Eisen, supra note 172, at 55 n.344 (discussing Michigan Public Service
Commission’s opposition to enforceable federal standards, except in limited areas,
such as cybersecurity).
273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
274. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2005) (holding that the “purely
intrastate” activity of growing marijuana for personal use could be federally
regulated since Congress rationally concluded that failure to so regulate would
undercut the regulation of an interstate market); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 560–61 (1995) (holding that the regulated intrastate activity must be an economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 124 (1942) (holding that the intrastate activity of growing wheat for personal
consumption may be federally regulated since Congress could have properly
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commercial activity and their cybersecurity choices could clearly have
an impact on the stability of interstate power grids, the national
economy, and national security—impacts that could all substantially
affect interstate commerce.275
FERC conveyed its understanding that, under EISA, Congress
gave FERC this type of comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction that
did not end at the traditional border between interstate transmission
and local distribution.276
Congress should grant NIST similar
authority to regulate cybersecurity amongst all Smart Grid
participants, which has the support of both law and logic, as NIST is
the agency with the expertise and experience to properly address
these cybersecurity issues.

2. Proposed Legislative Action: NIST Should Be Granted the
Authority to Issue Mandatory Enforceable Interoperability Standards
NIST has developed the expertise and experience necessary to
issue uniform, mandatory, enforceable federal interoperability
standards for Smart Grid participants through its development of
Smart Grid work product under EISA and its regulation of federal
information systems under the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).277 NIST should be given, by
statute, the responsibility and authority to issue mandatory
interoperability standards for all Smart Grid participants. Despite the
failure of legislation aimed at enhancing Smart Grid cybersecurity
primarily by expanding FERC’s authority to unilaterally institute
mandatory reliability standards under FPA, the prevalence of
cybersecurity legislation in both Houses indicates that the seriousness

considered that such activity could have a substantial effect on its effort to regulate
an interstate market).
275. See supra notes 247–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
impacts.
276. Congress authorized FERC to institute rulemaking proceedings to adopt
standards and protocols “in interstate transmission of electric power, and regional
and wholesale electricity markets.” 42 U.S.C. § 17385(d) (2012) (emphasis added). It
seems clear from the language of the statute that Congress granted federal
jurisdictional authority beyond the traditional interstate transmission line. FERC so
interpreted this language, finding its EISA authority applicable to “all electric power
facilities and devices with smart grid features, including those at the local distribution
level and those used directly by retail customers.” Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg.
37,098, 37,101 (July 27, 2009).
277. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, 116
Stat. 2899 (portions most relevant to this note codified as amended in sections of 40
& 44 U.S.C.).
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of this issue is entering the forefront of congressional consciousness.278
A bill that focuses on interoperability standards, places sufficient
authority in the hands of the appropriate agency with substantial
experience to draw upon immediately, and emphasizes how all
stakeholders would ultimately benefit from a uniform federal
standard279 might garner sufficient support in both Houses unlike
other legislation, like the GRID Act.280
The substantial expertise and competence that NIST has developed
and demonstrated while performing its duty under EISA has certainly
been noticed. Pike Research, a global clean technology market
research and consulting firm, noted in a 2011 report that a “number of
well-written guidelines include the three-volume U.S. NIST
Interagency Report . . . which covers smart grid cyber security
strategy, architecture, high-level requirements, and data privacy.”281
However, the report notes that “[n]one of those guidelines is an
enforceable standard,” and that “[t]his lack of enforceable
requirements leads to a scene of mass chaos in utility cyber
security.”282 Many utilities, the report posits, “will only invest in cyber
security when financial punishment for not investing is threatened.”283
Pursuant to EISA, NIST has made great progress in identifying the
fundamental building blocks of Smart Grid communication systems
and how they might be secured.284 NIST’s “Logical Reference
Model” (LRM)285 is a “composite high-level view of the actors within
each of the Smart Grid domains.”286 The model identifies key actors
in each domain, providing a title and description for each,287 as well as
the unique communication paths between those actors, referred to as
278. See supra Part III.C.
279. See supra Part V.A.3.
280. See supra Part III.C.
281. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 5.
282. Id.; see also DOLEZILEK & HUSSEY, supra note 148, at 5 (noting that “NIST
does not have authority to require compliance with NISTIR 7628, and indeed, the
document was not written to facilitate compliance enforcement”).
283. See PIKE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 5.
284. See NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 1.0, supra note 54, at 8. NIST emphasized
the need for a “common understanding of [the Smart Grid’s] major building blocks
and how they interrelate.” Id. To enable this understanding, NIST developed a
“conceptual architectural reference model” as a means to “analyze use cases, identify
interfaces for which interoperability standards are needed, and to facilitate
development of a cyber security strategy.” Id.
285. See NIST GUIDELINES VOL. 1, supra note 38, at 17.
286. Actors are devices, computer systems, software programs, or the individuals
or organizations that participate in the Smart Grid. They are needed to transmit,
store, edit, and process information in the Smart Grid. See id. at 14.
287. See id. at 18–24.
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“logical interfaces.”288 Each logical interface is categorized based on
the Smart Grid communication process of which it is a part.289
Graphical depictions of each category show actors involved in that
category and the discrete logical interfaces between them. These
visual depictions are accompanied by a legend that indicates
important security considerations relevant to the particular
category.290 Having identified and analyzed these fundamental
communication building blocks, NIST can regulate from a position of
substantive knowledge in setting security requirements for Smart
Grid communications with a focus on these fundamental blocks,
allowing for a regulatory system that is applicable to diverse business
models.
In determining how to convey its requirements and guide regulated
entities, NIST could draw on its experience regulating federal
information systems under FISMA. NIST has developed an approach
under FISMA by which two primary types of publications instruct
regulated entities: (1) Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) publications,291 and (2) Special Publications (SPs). Although
there are many FIPS publications and SPs, three are vital to the
regulatory framework: (1) FIPS PUB 199 sets forth mandatory
standards for categorizing information and information systems,292 (2)
FIPS PUB 200 establishes mandatory minimum information security
requirements for information and information systems in each
category,293 and (3) SP 800-53 recommends ways to achieve

288. The logical interfaces are uniquely identified using the format UXX, where U
standards for universal and XX is replaced by the specific interface number. See id. at
14, 17.
289. For example, the LRM identifies eleven logical interfaces that fall into
“Interface Category 1” which covers interfaces “between control systems and
equipment with high availability, and with compute and/or bandwidth constraints,”
such as communications between transmission SCADA and substation equipment,
distribution SCADA and substation and pole-top equipment, or SCADA and the
power plant. See id. at 27–29.
290. For example, several important security considerations for Interface Category
1 include “User Identification and Authentication,” “Denial-of-Service Protection,”
and “Communication Confidentiality.” See id. at 33.
291. FIPS publications are approved by the Secretary of Commerce and must be
complied with for federal information systems under the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002. See 40 U.S.C. § 11331(b)(1)(B)–(C) (2012).
292. COMPUTER SEC. DIV., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB 199,
STANDARDS FOR SECURITY CATEGORIZATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION AND
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2004), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf.
293. COMPUTER SEC. DIV., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FIPS PUB 200,
MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION
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compliance.294
NIST could draw upon these publications and
experiences in establishing mandatory minimum cybersecurity
standards295 and providing useful guidance to the Smart Grid
industry.296
In addition to granting NIST the authority to develop and issue
these standards, several considerations are important for potential
legislation. An enforcement authority provision would be necessary
to reinforce the mandatory nature of the standards. Other elements
that should also be considered for incorporation into proposed
legislation include the involvement of industry members, compliance
certification and possible “safe harbor” implications, and the ability
of the mandatory standards to evolve.
Potential legislation should grant a suitable entity enforcement
authority; perhaps similar to the authority granted the ERO for the
enforcement of reliability standards promulgated under the EPAct.297
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) might be an appropriate
enforcement entity in light of its recent enforcement proceedings
aimed at holding companies responsible for cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in their systems as constituting “unfair and deceptive
Some have displayed concern over the FTC’s
practices.”298
“willingness to dictate cybersecurity standards absent any regulatory
or legislative guidance regarding the scope, nature, or technical
details of those standards.”299 As it pertains to the Smart Grid,
mandatory enforceable standards developed by NIST would fill this
legislative/regulatory void, allowing NIST the ability to focus on one
of its core competencies—standards development—while the FTC
exercises its enforcement expertise in reliance upon the NIST
standards.

SYSTEMS (2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/FIPS-200final-march.pdf.
294. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 263.
295. FIPS 200 can serve as an effective resource in determining minimum
requirements. See COMPUTER SEC. DIV., supra note 293.
296. SP 800-53 would be an effective model from which to draw on for this
purpose. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 263.
297. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e) (2012).
298. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras et. al., Mapping Today’s Cybersecurity
Landscape, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1113, 1125 (2013) (discussing an enforcement
proceeding initiated by the FTC against HTC America); Jonathan T. Rubens, So

Many Privacy Rules! The Developing Standard of Care for Data Security and
Identity
Theft
Protection,
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(Jul./Aug.
2009),
http://www.search.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2009-07-08/rubens.shtml.
299. Contreras, supra note 298.

1404

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

Industry can, and perhaps should, be involved in the standards
development process. In the reliability sphere, FERC relies upon
NERC, an organization representing a broad array of Smart Grid
stakeholders,300 to develop mandatory standards.
In the
interoperability sphere, legislation could either allow or require NIST
to incorporate contributions by a representative group (perhaps
SGIP301) in developing its mandatory standards to ensure that
stakeholders are active participants in the process without unduly
slowing it down.302 The potential legislation could then grant NIST
the responsibility of submitting the interoperability standards for
public comment and promulgation by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, similar to the promulgation procedure
established under FISMA.303
NIST has recently completed “Phase 3” (the final phase) of its
“Plan for Interoperability Standards,” which entailed developing a
framework for testing and certification of how standards are
implemented in Smart Grid devices, systems, and processes.304 A
certification system would support the integration of the mandatory
standards proposed in this Note, possibly giving rise to a statutory
“safe harbor” from certain liability for certified compliant businesses,
similar to that which is utilized in state regulation of the payment card
industry.305

300. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the representative
aspects of NERC).
301. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the representative
aspects of SGIP).
302. One critique of the NERC-led process under the EPAct that gave rise to the
proposal of the GRID Act in the House of Representatives was NERC’s perceived
failure to take prompt action on grid security vulnerabilities. See MARKEY REPORT,
supra note 87, at 8 (noting, for example, that “more than six years after the
identification of the Aurora vulnerability . . . NERC still has not proposed any
reliability standard directly addressing that vulnerability”).
303. See 40 U.S.C. § 11331(b)(1) (2012).
304. NIST indicated that it has now completed its three-phase plan to establish
interoperability standards and protocols in a preliminary draft of its third release of
its “NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards”
document, the final version of which is planned for publication in the first half of
2014. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NIST
FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS,
RELEASE 3.0 (DRAFT) 11 (2014), available at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/
releases/upload/smartgrid_interoperability_final.pdf.
305. Similar “safe harbor” provisions have been instituted by state legislatures that
have chosen to mandate PCI-DSS compliance by statute. In Washington, a law was
passed holding some entities liable for certain damages if their negligence
proximately caused the damages caused by unauthorized access to account
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Any proposed or potential legislation should also recognize that
interoperability standards need to be capable of evolving over time to
address new challenges that arise.306 There should be allowance for
incremental alterations to regulatory catalogs of standards so that the
standards can grow with technologies, rather than “preserve
technologies in amber, making them potentially obsolete later.”307
CONCLUSION
The Smart Grid offers a number of benefits in the areas of
environmental consciousness, energy reliability and cost savings, and
new business opportunities. Despite these benefits, the transition
from an outdated Traditional Grid to an Internet-wired Smart Grid
presents a number of serious national security and privacy risks.
While regulatory standards issued to protect Smart Grid reliability
are mandatory, standards aimed at ensuring secure interoperability
are not similarly mandated. The stakes are too high to justify the
current environment in which adoption of important cybersecurity
standards remain merely voluntary. The rapid rate at which the
Smart Grid is developing demands immediate action to ensure its
resistance to cyber attacks. Legislation authorizing a federal agency
to develop and issue mandatory enforceable interoperability
standards would allow for a uniform, coherent approach aimed at
consistent protection of information travelling throughout the
complex Smart Grid network. NIST, given its demonstrated expertise
in the Smart Grid arena and its experience issuing mandatory
standards for federal information systems under FISMA, is the
appropriate entity to be given the authority and responsibility to
develop and issue these crucial standards. Such legislative action
would help to safeguard the security of the United States and the
privacy of its citizens by holding participants in this industry
accountable for their dedication to cybersecurity, while also providing
information under the entity’s control. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.255.020(3)(a)–(b) (West 2010). However, the statute provides for a “safe harbor”
by which entities would not be liable if they were “certified compliant with the
payment card industry data security standards adopted by the payment card industry
security standards council, and in force at the time of the breach.” § 19.255.020(2)(b).
306. This benefit of adaptability is recognized in SP 800-53, which aimed to provide
a “stable, yet flexible catalog of security controls to meet current information
protection needs and the demands of future protection needs based on changing
threats, requirements, and technologies.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra
note 263, at 2.
307. Eisen, supra note 172, at 51–52 (discussing this concern of utilities, PUCs, and
others that commenters raised in their opposition to the idea of FERC setting
mandatory interoperability standards under EISA).
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them with the sense of regulatory stability necessary for an
unwavering commitment to future innovation.

